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CP.APTER I

INTRODUCTIOH
The alM of this thesis is to work out a complete explanation of the

habitual. knowledge which St. Thomas sqs the human soul has of itself.

We

wish to explain the following statement of st. 'fh0ll18.8:

Bed quantum ad cop!tioDem bahitualem, sic dico quod an:1ma per
e.seat1Bll auam se videt" 14 est ex ht>c ipso quod essentia sua
est sibi praesens, est potens exira :i.n actum cogn1tionia su1
ipsiusJ aint aliquis ex hoc quod habet alicu1ua seientiae
habitua, ex ipsa praesentia habitus, est potens pereipere i1la
quae subsunt ill1 habitui. Ad hoc autem quod percipiat anima
.e ease, at quid in seipsa. agatur attendat, non requiritur
aliqu1e habitus; sed ad. hoe suttie!t sola ea_ntia animae
quae meati eat praesens J ex sa enim actus progrediuntur, in
quibua aotualltel' ip.a percipitur.1

The text .... have chosen appears as the second part of a four-part. antnIer

to the question whether the soul. knows iteelt by meana of its own essence or
by meana of 80JIle speci...

The main d5.:Y1aion of the response is two-folds

1)

concerning knowledge of the soul as existing in a particular individual. and
2) concerning knowledge of the soul leading to understanding of the nature of

--

the soul. !he first type of s.U-knowleclge 8l1IJW9rs the question an est? and
the second the question Suid

--

In. Ver.,

.!.!l'1 regarding

10, 8 e.

1

the human soul.

2

The knowledge the lJOul has of it sell" as an existing singular takes place
at two levelsl

actual knowledge and habitual knowledge.

nature also invo1'fts two 18'1818.

The knowledge ot 1t.

that of apprehension, 1n which the

scientific notion ot the soul is elaborated} and that of judgment, in wh1ch
the soul comes to cantina the content of apprehension as the true nature of

the soul.
Therefore, four distinct answers are giftn to the question whether tba
soul knowa 1tselt through 1ts e ••nee or through some species I

A.

Knowledge of the

indi~dual

--

an eat?

through the operations of the soul.

1.. Actual knovledge 2.

soul -

Habitual. lmowleclge -

through the essence

B. Knowledge of the nature of the soul --

1.

In apprehension -

2.

In judgment -

at the soul.

~!!l?

through the species.

through unchangeable truth, impressed. on the soul.

From the 'HOrde at st. Thomas, 1t is clear that habitual aelJ."....Jmowled.ge
is a condition underly'ing the actual knowledge the soul has at its existence
1n ita operations.

2

Ynus

~

text we will center our attention on describes

the peculiar aspect at the constitution at man which is the underl3'ing cause

at the e.xperienoe at sel.t-lmowledge in the soul.
Th. idea behind the choice

at this particular text 1s that the

~

at

211anfma per essentiam suam .. v1det, 1d est ex hoc ipso quod esaentia sua
est sibi praesens, .st potens exire in oognitionem troi ipsiua." Ibid.

-

3
the response and the answers to the opinions in thie article of the
comprise the most systematic elaboration of st. Thomas' thought on
-theVeritate
knower's
of h:imselt.3 Our purpose is to
more light on
De

throw

knowledge

this whole area of 'i'heaistic pqchology" by a thorough stud.v or the secoJld
the tour parts

~

ot the response.

The method of our study will be genetic.

in the Oommenta?: .2!!

~

the work of Chapter II.

We will first exudne the texta

Sentence. which pertain to our topic. This will be
Next, . . will study the treatment ot selt-knowledge

in God and in the angels aa founc1 in the

E! ....Ve....,ri
........
ta_te
...

in passages prior

to our

text. In the .. explanations we W1l1 try to uncover the general principles
which govern the aolution gi'f8n in our central text.

Chapter

m.

This is the work ot

In Chapter IV we will make a caretul stud;y of this centrral

passage, examining the exact wording and giving special empbuis
comparison of the human soul With an intellectual habit.

V,

118

to

the

Finall.y, in Chapter

will aurvey the later statements of st. Thomas which contr1bute to our

understanding of the soulls habitual self-know1edge as described in the

!!. Veritate.

Our objecti...

~en

is to reach a full understanding of the

.3rurthemore, this article is the one place where st. Thomas explains
habitual selt-knowledge. In the Commen~ on the Sentences re:f'lective
knowledge is treated in various passage8Utn.ver 1dth the cOl'Opl.etenes8 of
De Veritate, 10, 8. De Ventate, 1, 9, develops a special type of re.t1eotion
round in me movementrrom apprehension to judgment. In the Contra Gentiles,
46, the topic comes up in the course of the long argument concernirii tEe
end ot man. The distinction ot the soul'. knowledge of its existence from
knowledge of its nature is made, but the topic 18 not developed further. In
the Summa !heOlosaae, I, 87, 1, St. Tbomas compares Divine, angelic, and hUllan
sel.ttO«nowlecrg;;.n human selt-knowledge, the treatment is an abrid&ment of
De Ventate, 10, 6, without mention of habitual seU-knDvledge. :r:n the au-a,
1; 9:J, 1 a:a L, habitual self-knovledge is mentioned but without explanatIon.
Each of these texts will be examined in Chapter V.

m,

4
habitual knowledge the soul has of itself, with special attention to the
pertinent statements made by St. 'lbomaa before the composition of the eighth

-_

,.article ot the tenth question of the De Verita:te.
................
To complste this lntrocluctory chapter we v1ll examine briet'.q the previ-

oua work ot 1'homietic scholars on the text .. have chosen.

We v:1l1 proceed by

desCribing the contribution of four different writers to the elucidation of
the doctrine.

Fr. Ambroise Gardeil.. O.P., took up our text in the proces. of presenting
a theological explanation of grace and lI\18tical experience.4 His main idea
was that the babitual and actual kmwledge the soul has

ot i tselt

gi'ftS an

exact pattern to tollow in explaining the inhabitation of God in the just soul
and the consequent knowledge of God in Jr{1Stiea.l experience.' 'lbus an expla-

nation ot the soul's habitual knowladge of itself' was an important step in
the first stages of the _rIc Fr. Gerdeil Ulldertook.
Again and again, Fr. GardeU insisted that habitual self-knowledge was

~. Gardeil t S main lrIOrk in this area is La structure de 1 t ~ et
1 t!!1.'!rience ~ti9'! (Paris, 1921), 2 vole. He presenQ iii
stu~ ot
'the matter pe ining to this thesis in ItLa perception experimentale de l' sma
par e1le-meme d t apres saint Thoms.a," Mllan,.8 Thomiste8 (Kain, 1923).. pp.

earner

219-2.36.

>rr.

A
Gardeil 8\l1I1ma.r1zed. his intention: "La connaiaaanee hab1tuelle de
1 t au par so1 et la conscience actuelle de soi qui actualise cette conscience
habituelJ.e ne sont pas aeulemeRt una analog~, une ex.wnJ9.e, une modele de
ltinhabitation de Dieu dans ltmn.e Jl8l" 1& grace de l'experience m;ystique. Je
rega.rde la st1"ucture interne de 1 t ime et de la conscience psychologique comme
ut:lI8 raison explicative/a radice de la structure de l'habitation de D1eu dan8
18 juate, et de l'experience mystique. C'est d'ailleurs a priori inevitable
en wrtue du principle que' ee que est ~u ., confo:rme au-lOOClEl a'~ye de SOD
sujet recepteur. t Tout mon ouvrage 'tend ~ et&blir cette oonftmmite
structurale. ft In ftQuestion de nomenclature ell matiere de contemplation,"
Rew.e Thomiste, XIV (July, 1931), 727.

the particular disposition or the soul which made experimental selt-awareness
possible. Once the intellect i8 in operation, the habitual disposition passes
into actual perception of the soul with the result that the knower can aftirm
wi th certitude,

ft

-

It is I who thinks and knows. It

6

'!he intention in Fr. GardeU's diSOUS8ion

allow that this particular Vpe

ot

_

or our De ...........................
Veritate

text is to

knoW'l.ed.ge reaches the existing, concrete

substance or the soul. thus it is an experimental knowledge ot the

80ul

which

proceeds trom the habitus ot selt-knowl.edp.
The part ot Fr. Garde1l's work which is relevant to us is the a:r;planation
he dew loped or the prior disposition of the soul tor self-awareness in its

operations. His explanation contains two points,

first, on the nature ot the

soul as a 8p1r1t.l and aeco!1dlJ', on the compari8on with an intellectual habit
implied. in the name applied b.Y

st. Thomas.

'!he human soul occupie8 a unique position among spiritual. substances.

A8

a ep1r.1t, it i8 a bej.ng graced with both intelligence and intelllg1b1llty.
But as a spirit united with matter, the taculty

know in cooperation with

aens~t1on.

ot intelligence is ordered to

'rhus the human knowing power is in the

presence of a knowable object-ita own sub.tance.....w.t is prevented trom actual

6nu..

mode ot phrasing the result of the actuation or habitual seltknowledge is traced to San Sever1~ whom Gardeil singles out as contributing

greatq to his own thought. cr. Me~s '1'bom1stes, p. 219, n. 1. San
Severino developed this id8a in· an an:t:::.ttantian epistemological context as he
took up consciousness as a criterion of knowledge which reaches beyond
P:henomena 1:.0 the concrete, existing self. cr. Georges van Rait, Lt
ee1st.emoloS,1e thoaiste (Louvain, 1946), pp. 64-65.
-

6
knowledge of this object. This state of "prevented. knowledge" is what St.
Thomas describes as the soul's ha.bitu.a.l knowledge of itself. 7

-

Fr. Gardeil, following the progression of the text of the De Veritate,
comments on the aptness of the comparison of the relation of the soul to
itself as a. present but unknowable object of knowledge ld,.th the rela.tion of a
de'Veloped mind to its achieved knowledge through retained species in the
mind.

B
'1'b.e work of Fr. Gardeil provides the actual point of departure for the

work of this thesis.
texts of

st.

We wish

to expand his explanation by resea.rch into the

'!'bemas in which . . can see the d.evelopment of the idea of

habitua1 selt-knowJ.edge in the human soul.
A _cond writer lIho haa taken up our text is Fr. Blaise Romeyer, S.J. 9
His work ranks as a peculiar contribution to the stream of discussion in
Thomistic epistemology in the period betwen the World War.. He proposed an
interpretation of St. Thomas which fea.tured a concrete intuition of material

7"Force est done ~ 1'~ ,intelligente de dem.eurer en suspens vis-}-v18 de
cet opjet qui lui est eependant immanent, qu'e1le a tout ce qu'il taut pour
eonna!tre, _is dont eUe ne pe~ rh.llser la conna.issance actuelle In raison
de sa consti,.tution organique prtylf!nte, qui 1a lie au cSrps dans son
at
dans son operation. C'est eet etat de connaisaanee lies qui est appele par
/'
saint Thomas du noll de conna1ssance habitue1le." Gardei1, Me1a!l£!s Thomiste8,

etr,

p.

224.

B.'Aucun e~le ne saurait m:1eUl) nous,. fa1re ente~ 14 structure
interieure de 1t ame, naturellement iecondee p!u" e11e""lneme, dans 110rdre
,. " par l'eSP-Etce impres8e, ( ou,
intelligible, eomme,l\ltesprit du savant est feconde
ce)lUi rev:l.ent au m.eme, par un habitus acquis), au point dtii'tre v1rtuell.ement
pregnant. de l'act. de connaisaa.nce de so1." Ibid.

-

9uSa.int Thomas et notre connaiasance de II esprit humain," Arahi vea de
Philosoph1.e, VI (1928), 137-250.
-

7

10

slngu.l.are and a direct knowledge of spiritual realities.
The aspect of Romeyer' 8 work which pertains to our thesis is the survey be
made of the Thomistic texts concerning the knovabi1ity of the human soul.

His

treatment of the doctrine of habitual. self-knowl.edgeU is in the manner of a
paraphrase, with an added evaluation of the aptness of the word habitual in
this context.

On one hand the word. implies "too much" ai"nee the acquired

habit supposes prev.i.ous exercise of the intellectual faculty. This is more tha1
the innate diapoaition described by st. Thomas.

On the other hand there is a

wakness in the compari son in that the word. habitual ord.1naril\r indicates
knowledge determine<ll'q a group ot species 'Which are in turn formed through the

influence ot material objects. Habitual sc:i.entitic knowledge is thus an accidental modif1cation of the mint1.

But the soul's knowledge

ot itself is eftn

"more habitual," since its cause lies molly w1thin-in the very essence of
the BOul. 'the operation of the laIow1ng faculty on some object is merel1' a

condition tor the actuation of the soul's knowledge ot i tsell.

A second pertinent aspect ot ROIIlt!J3'Grt s work is his discussion ot the soul'.
lcnowledge of it sell' as tound

1!l the

CommellY2z !!! ~ Sentencel"12 His

correlation of the Augustinian intell1gere w:tth habitual

selt~knowledge

proYide

us with the starting point of our textual atudy. Our method, however, 1d.11

lOcf. van Reit, pp. 483-487.

~omeyer, Arehi'V8', VI, 193-19S.

-

12Ibid., 188-191.

8
differ :in two major aspects from that of RomByer.

Fu-st., the focus of all our

stu<:\r remains on one passage of St. 'thomas. As the texts are taken up, we will
be seeking light on the one
to use the

!2! Veritate

text on habitual self-knowledge. Secondly, we

ajm

diacU8sions of self-knowledge in God and in the angels

for their elaboration ot the general principles governing all instances ot a

knower's knowledge ot himself.
A third author 1IIhose work has played an important part in the prel.iminary

steps of this thesis is Fr. J. Webert,o.P.lJ He baa pointed out the major

text. to be studied and has made an

order~

st.

Thomas.

re.tlective knowledge treated by

catalogue of all the types

~

Another part of Webertls contribution to this thesis is his disOWIsion of
"the metaphysics of refiection" in which he pointed to the Comment:a:z.2!l ~
L1ber

.!!! ...C&...,U_S....1.8......,

Proposition F1.t'teen,

thought.14 Our approach will be

proposition in two
make.

ot

~a.

e.8

a significant part ot

st..

Thomas'

-

to stw:\v the importance of the Liber de Cauais

First, .. will examine carefullY' the use St. Thomas

the proposition in passages prior to our central text.

Secondly,. we

will evaluate the CoJm!l8ntarx o.t St. Thomas tor its contribution to our understand.ing

ot the

ground

ot all selt-kDowledge

in the human soul.

A fourth author who haa treated. the doctrine of habitual aeU-kJ»wledp is

13

;"

,,/.

"Ref'lexio....-etude ~ lea operations retlexivea dana la psychologie de
saint Thomas d 1Aquin,· Me±m!R!a Mandon:net (Pari., 1930), I, 285-32$.

14Ibid.., 320-324.

-

9
Fr. Georges Ducoin" S.J.
for St. Thomas man is

15

The intention of rucointa paper was to tilow that

radic~

self-consciousnes8.

He finds this idea

This equation of
a radical, or ontological, self-consciousness i8

implied in the very text we have chosen from the De Veritate.
habi tua.1 sel.f-knowledge and

greatly reinforced by the explanation St. Thomas gi'Ves in his commentary on the

-

fifteenth proposition of the Liber de Gausis.

Fr. Dueoin justifies his stress

on the cOl1Il1'lentary by evidence fran two texts of the

!!!. Veritate16 lhich,

he

argues, show that the explanation of this proposition is more than jU8t the
exposition of the thought of another" but actually contains the personal
thought of

st.

Thomas.

-

In our study we will treat the use St. Thomas made of the tiber de Causie
proposition both in the Commentarr .2!

2

Sentences and in the

.!2!. Veritate.

However, the evidence will force us to minimize the importance of this text in
the thought of St. Thomas.

In our tinal. chapter, we will exrunine the

Commenta!I ot St. Thomas and our argument will be to interpret the passage as
an instance

ot st. Thomas g1ving

another without any

signitica~t

a full literal exposition of the thought

ot

interjection of his own thought.

In view of these earlier studies

ot B! Veritate, q. 10, e.. 8, we can

restate the aim of this thesis. We propose to study the movement ot the mind

15"L'homme camne conscience de soi selon saint 'lllomas dtAquin," Sapientia
A,uinatilu Communicationes IV Oongressus Thomistic! Internationalis (Rome,
1 $5), pp. 24'-2~.
-

l6n.
- Ver.,
-

2, 2 ad 2; and 1, 9 e.

10
of St. Thomas through lds earliest writings toward the formulation of the
doctrine of habitual self-know1edge as stated in this part of

ti1El

~ Ver:i.tate.

\>le will start our quet3t tor under.tanding the doctrine of habitual 881£-

knowlede:e in tho
f~:nte!l!!."

in

b~"l

'Wh~,ch

soul by eX8lldnintt a t.ext in the

Commen~.22

Jm.

St. Thomas states +..hat the easenoe of the soul has

It

'ftt17

close slmilarity to an intellectual hlilbit.
Ad pl"imum ergo diceudum quod ad 0.se habitus 1ntell&ct1v1
d:uo concurruntl scU10et species intell1g1bw.. at l.tmrm
inte1lectua agenti. quod tac1 t eel 1.ntelligibUem in actu:
unCle Ed. aliQUfl, speci•• fU'J.t qua :tn. haberet lumen. illud
baberet rnt10nem habitue, quantum pertinet ad hoc quod 6saet
pM:ncip!a actus. Ita dieo, quod. quando ab am. occnoao1tur
aliqu1d quod est in ipea non per sui td.milltudinea, sed per
__ easentia. ipaa ....ntia rei cogi'itae est loco habiiiua.
Unde· d1co, quod ipsa easentJa ~, prout ••t mota a se1paa,
habet rat.:l.oIall bah!tua.1

fhe context of this

JlUItIilp

1. a question about 5t. Augustine 'a

deecr:ipt1on of bow an !.triage of the Trinity ia loUDe! in

whether the triplet, _ . rJDt.1t1a.,

!! !!J.r.

really

MD..

dU.ten

aecom

Thequeet1cm ia
from. the

met.

meaoria. ~;Uent1a. ~ volunt.u, 1tdch . . d18cu1JllllJd in the art1clea of tbe
preceding question.
The ~

given by st. Thomas is that the tirst

~.mage

refers to three

d1ttenlnt pow", ot the soul, while the second 1Mge considere the __ nee f:4

- -" --

lrn I sent •• .3, S, art. un.

ad

1.

n

12

-

the superior part of the soul (mens) and the two consubstantial habits
2
(notlt1al habitus memoriae and amor: habitus voluntatis).

-

The first contrary opinion is based on the earlier affirmation th& t an
image of the Trinity is :found in the human soul especially when the soul i teel
is the object of its operations.3 The argument in the objection is that the
soul knows itself by means of its own essence and not through the mediation of
any habit.

Thus, since

II.

habit is not found in the soul's knowledge of itself,

-

an image involving the soul's habits, notitia and amor, is a poor repreaen'ta.
tien

ot

the Trinity.

The response to this opinion aims to show how the essence of the soul
resembles an intellectual. habit, since the soul knows itself through its own
essenee~

It is to be noted. that St. Thomas makes no formal acceptance of the

proposition that the soul knows itself through its own essence.

The force ot

the response is that i f the soul does know itself in the manner stated in the

opinion-:l!! essentj.am

~then

the image is sa'Wed because in this selt-

knowledge the essence of the soul functions ve;r.y much in the manner of an
intellectuaJ. bab!t.
'!'he argument of the response is based on the nature of an intellectual
habit as an intelligible species in the intellect. The second :factor in the

2fthaec assignatio sumitur secundum essentiam at habitus constibstantiales;
praedicta autem secundum potentiaa.rt Ibid. sol.

-

3Ibid., 3, 4, 4 sol.

-

constitution of an intellectual habit ia the light of the agent intellect by
which the species is made intelligible in aet.

A m1ddle step in the argument

is to consider how a species hav.tng intellectual ligl"it of itself would be like
a habit, since it could of itself be a source (Eincipi'Ulll) of an act of
knoWledge.

Thus, i f the essence of the soul leads to the knowledge of some-

thing, and since that essence is the source of intellectual light, that essence
would be f'unction1ng just like a

hab1~ ~

habitus.

4 Thus,

in the

knowledge of itself', involving no species but only the soul's essence, that
essence is the source of the act of knowledge just as an intellectual. habit is
the sourceS of the act of knowledge concerning something known habituaJ..ly.
This first passage of our study ot bab1 tual self-knowledge in the

Commen!.:!:l .2! .!!! Sentences is important as the one place before the central
passage in the

1?!. _Ve......ri
.........
ta.....te
....

in which the soul.' s knowledge of itself is d1rec1iq

compared with habitual scientific
of the

~

knowle~1e.

Thus, we have some explanation

used in the central passage in this thesis.

However, the actual

value o:t the passage in our quest for understanding is small.
thetical. strain running

throu~

the passage has been noted.

First, the h\YPo..
Secondly, no

preCise determination is made of the exact kind of knowledge the soul has of
itself' through its essence.

hIbid., .3, $, !tl. ~.

Thir~, o~

one causal factor regarding this

ad 1.

5!ll habits are eources of acti'Vity in operative powrau "habitus,
secundum proprietatem sui nominis, significa.t qualitatem qwundam quae est
princ1pium actus, intormantem at perteeientem potent1am." In n Sent., 24, 1,
1801.
-

kind of sel.f'-knowledge hall been memiomcb

the tact t.hf.!t tb& aoul hu of

itself'the l1t,llt of agent intel.leot. We must . . flZplanation oithe ulti_te
ground. of this knowledge tile lIOul baa of 1tselt.

we

cmn move to the _COM pht.ee of our study of b.abituAl aelt-knovledp in

the ~=z ~ !2!

noted a'bo\1t.

~le

win

fienten•• b7

lie_

t.o

~ to 8Upp~

answer this question

tems of the p&aae.ge just atud1e41

iteelt. does the soul. know itselt

tor the aeoond datio1ency

Wb~ ch

. . will phrase in

since the aoul baa 1rrt.ell111ble light of
6

~.,

Mce tbts question 1s Ii-n o:.pl1elt treatment in the

~Jl!:!tl

2!l

~

Sentences. In tbe ar\icle 1mmecUateq i.-tore tbe one .. haft just examined,

st. 1'homa8 . . . whether tbe ratic:mal powere are u_s in act nth regard to
the objects

towards Which the lJOul teat . . .q>lit1ea an

1mage 0:£ the Tr1ni t,y.

These two Ob~ of knowledge and low are God and the soul itself.7 In a
later art1c"JJJ8 be diaeu. . . our

~

of our own habits ard

po~rsJi

and. in

the response to the fourth objection in this second article he touooes on the

8Oul*a knowledge

ot !tselt.

We 1f1l1 find it helpful to study st. 1homes t tNat..nent of the question in
both pusaaea Ednce bis negative answer in the .first pas~ is based on a

~ t.l:. ccapari80D with habitual aell'..cnowladge appeare to rule out
continual actual knowledge, sUll
'qu.at1on
attention. Moe St.
'lhomrulJ deseribQ the soul as reing preaent to itselft 1fetiam ardol'la Bild. ipa1
praeaena ealt," (Ib1ct., 3. 1, 2 ad 3), and "crum 1pn. an1ma natu:ral1ter dt a1b1
praeRl'Jll," (rb~, 1,. l~ sol.). "the question then raeins Whether thi.
p1"9Mnce Cttn~8 the union with the 1.n:telligible object wtLiah 18 _sentla1

m.

in krto1fl.edge.

-

1Ibid.., 3, h,
8!b1d., 17, 1,

!).

4 ad 4.

de_"",

reason of fact end in the second on a reason of right proceeding from the
necessary mode of human knowledge.

Thus"

j.n

both articles we will find an

early treatment bY' St. Thomas of a question of continual self-knowledge" a
question all.ied. to ours of the habitual knowledge the soul is said to have of
itself.
1'he first solution begins with a distinction of the three wrds used by

st.

Augustine regarding knowledge.

There follows the first part of the answer

to the question whether the soul knowe itself (or God) always:
Secundum August1num, l!! utUitate 0redend1, cap. xi,
differunt cogita.re. diacernere J at intelligere. Disoernere
est oognoscere rem per dif'ferentiam sui ab aliis. Cogitare
auts est cons ide rare rem secundum partes at proprietates
suaSI 1nde dicitur quasi coag1tare. Intelligere autem dicit
nlliil aliud quam simplicem intuitum intellectue in 1d quod
sibi est praesens intelligibUe. Dico ergo, quod anima non
semper cogitat et discernit de Deo, nee de 88, quia siC
quU1bet sciret naturaliter totam n"'turam an1mae suae, ad
quod v:tx magno studio perveniturJ ad talem enm cognitionem
non suffieit praesent1a rei quolibet modo J sed oportet ut
9
sit ibi in ratione objecti, et exigitur intentio cognoscenti••

Thus the reason that the soul does not know itself allFcl\rS, in the sense 0
cogitare or discernere, 1s the clear fact that all men do not know the nature

of their soul--a neoessary consequence i f the questioned proposition were

true.
In s¢ng that disoernere and

objeot"

st.

coew"

require presence

precia.~

as an

Thomas has touched on the reason of right wioh is the sole answer

in the other passage on this question.

The natural mode of human knowledge is

10

:i.ndicate4 ·when he AY1J that an int4tnM.on (or apee18.

) is required in knoW1ng

the natura c4 the soul.
In prooeeeding to treat the AUt.,~ ~!t!B!re, st. Thanns does &l.l.ov
SOM t,pe of cont.j.m.uU oolt-knoWledgel

"Sed secundum quod lntelJ.1gere rdh1l

al:1u.d est quam praesentia intellifg1bil1s ad 1nt.elleetl.R quoeUMq'tJe modo, 810
anima JlIWm'pel" intellig1t _

We can enter almoat
patlllit8ge

tbe

wtd.cb

e\ ~.ll.

paren~

tlle last. sentence. 0.£ the first

Ii-, aa another way the soul could be BIdet to be known always.

rut that in every act of knoWledae the light at agent int4l.le<Yt and the

reaep\i:v1v of the possible 1nt.elleot are involWl4.
Al10 ta.men l!lOdo, aecunctura pb.U.oaopboe, 1ntell1g1tur quod aniM
_nper .. intelligit, eo quod G1lU1IlJ quod ~ntelllg1tur, non :intel.l!situr n1ad. 1ll.wstratua lUJJd.rwt intellectwJ ag81ttu et
receptull in :Llltellectu posaibil1. Unde aieut in omni colore
Y1detur l.1.I8l eorpo~, ita in ami inteU1g1hU1 Y1dev
1. .0 intel.lectwJ agentiaJ nop_tamen in l"1'.t1one objec'td, sed
in mtlona medii COgno8C8nd1.U
The MOomi paaeage in llhioh

st. Tbomas tclucbee

on t~ queat:1on

or

continua1 selt-knowledge gives ue an anNU" bead on tbenecea.ry mode of
human knowinl'h The principle is announced in the 'body of the solution.

lOr..1'. !!! Ver., 10, 8, vhere st. ThfDaS quotes .AWl"l'Oe8, "1:ntelleow
1ntel11a1' per1ntentlonem in eo, aiout i.n al1a irttelllg1b1l!a." st. 'lbcaaa
then explairut, aquae quidem 1ntenM.c njJlil alind set quAtn species
inteU1g!b1Us.llIn I tent.,), 4, S sol. The Parma edition adds the vord indeterm1nate
as the ta.t ;o'i!d of the _ntence and so ,ntudere this type of knowIitG eVen •.
more teuuoua.

17
Quia cum intellectus noster potentialis sit in potentia ad
omnia intelligibilia, et ante intell1gere non sit in actu
aliquod sorum} ad hoc quod inte1ligat actu, oportet quod reducatur in actum per species aeceptas a. senaibus 1llustratas
lum1ne intellectus agent!s • • • • Unde cum naturale 81ii
nobis procedere ex sensibus in intell1gibilia, ex etfectibus
in causas, ex posterioribus in priore • • • 1deo est quod
potentiu animae et hab! tus non possumus cognoscere nisi per
actus at actus per objecta.13

rhus ... see that to be present to the intellect precisely as an object of
understandi.ng neana to be present as dariwd t.rom sense data.

This is the

natural orientation of the human intellect which governs sl.1 our knowledge,

even of the interior realities such as the powers of the soul and the habits
or virtues.
In the anawer to the fourth opinion in the article, St. Thomas applies

this principle to the case of the soul.' s knowledge of itself.

In tba last

sentence he returns to the A.ugustinian sense of intelligere as a. possible way
of haVing continual. self-knowledge in the soul.
Ad quartum dicendum, quod ad hoc quod aliquid cognoscatur
ab anima, non sutficit quod sit sibi praesens quoeumque modo,
sed in ratione object!. Intellectui auteln nostro nihil est
secundum statum viae praesens ut objectum, nisi per a1iquam
similitud.1nem ipsius, vel BOO effectu acceptam. quia. per etfectus devenimus jn causas. Nt ideo ipsam animam et potentias ejus et habitus ejus non cognosc:tmus nisi per actus, qui
eognoscuntur per objeeta. Nisi largo mock> ftl:imus loqui de
cognitione, ut Augustinus loquitur, secundum quod intell1gen
nihil allud !pt quam praesentialiter intellectui quooumque
modo adesae. J4

-

13Ibid.• , 17 J 1, 4 sol.

14~...

ad

4.

18
Thus our question whether the soul knows itself always has been answered
with a definite negative answer regarding knowledge in :l.ts proper sense.

The

---

reasons are that 1) de facto .. men do not naturally' know the nature of the soul)
and 2)

2!. jure,

the soul is not ali1f'8\V'8 present to t he intellect in the manner

which human knowledge requires.

In a very wide sense, however, it can be said

that the soul knows itself because of the presence of the soul to the
intellect.

to

'!'his presence can be termed, t..l1e ontoloi!cal presence of a SUbject

the power which emanates from itself'.

The type of presence indicated by the August:lnian sense of intelligere may

well aid us :in understanding habitual self-knowledge.

In the

.E!. ...Ve_ri
.......
ta...,te
.. the

likeness to a bahit 1s based on the presence of the essence of the soul to
itself'.

In the tllO passages

'We

have just examined these two phrases were

indirectly appl:ie d to the soul t s mode ot presence,

"praesentia intelligihills

ad intellectum quocumque modo" J and "praesent1ali ter intellectu1 qUGcumque modo

ade ••• n

Thus the ontological presence described in tb!l se passages ln8\V be 1)

middle term. joining habitual self'-know18dge and the Augustinian intell:1ere

into an equivalence; and 2) an indication of the cause of habitual selfknowledge.

This last point is right at the heart of this thesis and we will

return to it when we take up the explanation of our central passage.
A third phase of our study of the Co:mmenttlIX .2!l

!:.h!. Sentences

will be to

expand what we have read a.bove about the method the soul must follow 1n coming

to

know its habits, powers, and eventually itself.

lIm1 .fI.re

these interior

realities to be known which cannot be present to us a.s derived from sense
data?

In two passa.ges _

have

alree.~

touched on the method.

It ha.s been

19
described by the general name of "reasoning £rom objects to acts and from acta
to the power.»15 Secondly, its necessity was based on our natural orientation
to reach intellig:i.ble objects through the sensible.

16

We find a more systematic explanation of this method in a later passage.17
The question is whether we can know our own habits.

St. Thomas first div.1.des

the question into 1) a treatment of knowing them in their quiddity (secundum ~
~

m)' and 2) a treatment of knowing them in their properties (SU!ntum!!

!! quae lpsam COnsequWltur). Then he

elividea the question of knowledge of the

quiddity of habits into 1) knowledge of what they are

knowledge that they are (an est).

--

the body of the response

j.n

(quid!!!h

and 2)

This last division parallels the diVision of

-

our central passage in the De Veritatel thus, we

stand to gain :trom examining St. Thomas' discussion of the second hall' of the
question.
In explaining our knowledge of the nature of a habit,

st.

Thomas specifies

the reasoning process described above as a movament from. the actions to their

proportionate eauset
effectum. Et quia

"habitus ipsos per actus cognoac1mus, sieut eausam per

nos aUIDHlUS ~usa

aetuum, ideo actus eognoscimu,. per aetum

rationis imestigantis quid sit necessarium in actu 1110 ex proportio1'l8
object! boni et finis."

18

15ftmaxima d1ftieultas est in cognitione an:bnae, nee devenitur in ipsam
nisi ratioeinando ex objectis in actus at ex actus in potent!am." Ibid., 3, 1,
2 ad 3.

-

-

16Ibid., 17, 1, h sol.

Cf. p. 17 above. '

- -Sent., 23, 1, 2

17In

III

801.

Far more important for us is the descr:tption of the way one knows the

existence of his own babita:
Sed i1le qui habet habitum • • • cognosci t sa habere babitum
1nquantum percipit inclinationem sui ad actum., secundum quam
Be habet aliqua.liter ad actum llllllil. Et hoc quidem cognoseit
homo per modum ref1ectionis, in quantum scilicet cognoscit se
operari quae operantur. Et ideo dicit Augustinus quia
buius modi habj, tus cognoscuntur per suam praeeentiam. quantum
ad hunc modum. 19
There are four things to be noted from this passage'

the 'WOrd pgrcigit

~

1) By the use of

can establish a similarity with our central

E! Veritate

text, a slmilarity over and above the methoc.ological structure of the
articles.

two

In both cases the word Ji:!!2iIrl;t refers to our knowledge of the

existence of an inner reality of the huroan person.

2) A step toward this

knowledge of one's own habits is that a person knows himself to be the agent

or source of an activity_ 20 3) The action by which a person canes to this

.

knowledge is called a reflection.
Augusti.1l6

It) 'l'he ceuse of this knowledge is said by

to be simply the presence of the babi t.

'!hese points indicate that this questJ.on bears definitely on our study
the soul's knowledge

at itself._ If a tentative

at

analogy may be made, we can s

that because of the presence (4) of the soul to itself, there is a refieetion
0) imro1ved in ita operations in which it perceives (1) that it exists as the

~ere we find a remote textual justification for the interpretation of
San Severino and Gardeil. Cf. p. 5 abo"fe.

21
a.gent (2) or proport.iona:te cause of the operat.ion.
We ldll proceed by seeking

treated in t.he Commentary- .22

to amplify our understanding of reflection as

~

Sentences. We can begin by examining t.he

answer to the third opinion in the question studied above.

st.

Thomaa first.

describes the refiection leading to knowledge of the nature of the soul:
"Intellectus autem, ut dicitur in

nl

-

De Anima, sicut. alia, oOgIlOscit. 8eipsum,

quia scilicet. per speciem non quidem sui, sed object)., quae est forma. ejus; ex
qua. cognoscit actus sui naturam, at ex na.tura. actus naturam potent1ae

cognoscentis, et ex natura potentiae naturam 8ssentiae, et per consequens
al1.srum potent1arum."

our central

21

This is the method described in the second. half of

12! ....V_er_j_ta_te_ text.

knowledge of itself described.

and the way we haw already seen the soul t s

22

'!'he a.dvance made in this trea_nt of the soul's knowledge of itself is

in the Mention made of a second kind of reflection -which leacls to knowledge of
the existence of the soul's acts.

In the present passage, the fact of such a

re.fleetion is just stated along wit.h the explanation that such an operation c
onl¥ be had in a power that has no

bodi~

organ:

.Al.1o modo anima reflectitur super actus suos cognoseendo illos actos
esse. Hoc autem non poteat esse ita quod aliqua potentia utens
organo corporall ref1ect1tur super actum. propril.U!l, quia oportet quod.
instrumenturn ead$ret medium inter ipsam potentiam et instrumentum
quo primo eognoseebat. • •• Intelleetus autem cum sit potentia non
utens organa carpor-ali, poteet cognoscere actum suum., secundum qwd
patitur quodammodo ab objecto at informatur per speciem objecti."""2J

-

2lIbid., ad 3.

22Ibid.,

23rn
-

3. 1, 2 ad .3

-

and 17, 1,

In Sent., 23. 1, 2 sol.

4 801.

Th'U8 _ ..,. draw this diettnction 'b«bveen tho two Id.nda of're1"l.eetiODI

netleoti.on

<'»1

the ooture

ot tbe 110\11 or

of' a habit 18 a type

ot

stu.d¥ of a dileund.'V$ nntlJ1'e te81nrj,ng with study of the object.

1)

inqu.1r'.1 or

at knowledge

or wlltion and lead1.ng to understa.'t:'d1nr, ot the nature o,f the act, or ot the
:power, or even of the nature of the soul, the subject ot Inlch operations. Tbe

emphaaia in all of ttda 18 on the quidd:1.ty or tale1ty of tl'ase int.erior
2) Reflection on the ex1stenoe of the acta or hahite i . baled on

real1t1ea.

the independence of the lntellect and Will of Jtlaterial orprdJ in tlte1r
operationa~

'this hut kind of retl6et1on call.s tor further stud.Y_

Two t1lma 5.n the ~n!:!t:z.:a ~ ~.~.,

this re.naction

Wh~ eh

tells

uti

that.

OUt"

st. Thcna8 haa ment.1oned.

operation exists. In the t1ret

pasage,* he 111 explain1ng how our de.b.. tor, and enjOyment at, an end
coale. ._ With desire

am

.n~ :re~.ng

ttle opernt1on by whiob ".

reacm

that end. !b.1a aspect of the wUl's cpoft.tion 1s :pare.llal w:1th the act of the

intellect. Vl'IBN •

UD.raratand an object and understand. that . . ~tend in

the . . . operation.
uaiEt~

'1'b.s second pa8aaae25 t1ncbJ the identity of the intellect's

of It_lt aD! of· ita Dot of aeU-underatanding as an a"1llogy with

the 'lr101t.y where there is

l'lOt

another act ot love by .1iCh the loft

be~n

Father .an4 Son i8 an object. of 10'98. 1bus this :reflection in Which we kDov
I

1 ,

I

r

2Sttnon aUo actu potentia tftJ't,ur ~j'j' objectum .t j.n actwl su_, eodem enUl
actu intellectus intel.l1g1t .. et intel.l.igit .. 1ntelllgere." JIbid., 10, 1, S
ad 2.

23

our intellectual act is concomitant (eadem 0E!ratione) with those acts and
is characterized by directness and immediacy.
The cause ot this second kind of reflection has been indicated as the
immaterlility ot these intellectual operations. 26 This is significant since
the r.dm of this thesis is to explain the passage

whe~

+.lle cause of the soul' 8

actual knowledge ot i tselt is gi'nn as its habitnal knowledge of i tselt
through its essence.

For a complete expla.nation of habitual selt-knowledge in

the soul we will haw to determine the exact relationship of the soul's
immateriality to the state of habitual knowledge of the soul.
We will now turn to the fourth part of our stutW of the Commen:t!n:

.2!! ~

Sentences and examine more in detail how ilmnateriality is the cause or
immedia:te renection.

In one ot the treatments ot renection St. Thomas states

that a material power does not reflect on its operations, but that an
immaterial power does reflect.

27 Two line s of explanation for Ulis tact are

taken ups

1) Et ideo dicendum quod potent1ae immateriales refieetuntur
super sua objecta; quia intellectus intelligit Be intelligere,
at similiter voluntas vult se wUe et diligit se dilige:re.
Cuius ratio est, quia actus potentiae immateriills non ex...
clud1tur a ratione object!. Objectm enim voluntatis est
bomnl1j et sub hac ratione dilig1t volunta.s OIllDB quod diligit.;
ideo potest diligere actum suum inquantum est bonus) at s1.mi1i tar est ex parte intellectusl

2) .t propter hoc, libra De causis, proposit1o XT, dieitur quod
cujuscumque actio reditin esaentiam agentis per quamdaa
re1.'lectionem., oportet 8ssent1am ejus ad seipsam redire, i ~ est

26In III Sent., 23, 1, 2 sol.

-

-

- -

27In I Sent., 17, 1, 5 ad 3.

in se subaistentem eSHA, non super aliud delatam, id est non
dependent.em a materia. 20

The first reason behind imnediate refiection is that the acts of the

immaterial powers are jncluded in the transcendent objeots of these same
powers.

The :implication j8 that the operation of the intelleot is itself able

-

-

t.o be understood fundamentally because it ie and so is convertible with the

-

true-the transcendent objeot of the intellect.

Surely this is an

expla.nation which can be ampl:i.fied into a metaphysical explanation of the

knowability of the habits of the intellect, of the power itself, and of the
Thus, as the intelleot comes to know an

soul as the SOUToe of the power.

intelligible object there are at once a group of knowable,

,

realities present in the act of knowing.

29

am.2! ..t&C;;.;>....to... known,

Still, we have not reached an

explanation of :immateriality as a ground of the possibility of reflection.

Let

us study the seoond part of the above passage for such a causal explanation)O
It will be helpful to analyze the content of the last five lima of the

text into four parts s

28.!,u I ~., 17, 1,

5 ad 3.

The author has divided the text.

29Thi8 suggests a description of knowing as havin~ a first stage in which
objecti.ve and subjeotive (the act, the power, the soul) elements are known as
confused parts of the whole. We read that such an ocourrence i8 possible:
"partes possunt intelligi dupllcitera uno modo sub quadam confusiona, prout
aunt in toto; et sic simul cognoeeuntur per unam f01"ll8li1 totius, at s1c simul
cognoscuntur.-S.T., I, 8S, 4 ad 3.

--

3Or.his passage does not contain a literal quotation of the tiber de
Causis. It is a paraphrase of the passage including the fifteenth proposition
and the .five explanato:r;,v statements which accompany the proposition" The same
propoSition, "Omnis sciens qui scit essentiam suam, est rediens ad essent1sm.
suam reditione eompleta.," is also used in In II Sent., 19, 1 .. 1, to substantiab
a proof for the 1mmateriality of the soul Which 'haSbeen built on the
retlect1ve act of the soul.

2$

1) A gi'Veni

An agent wlth immediately retlective operations.

2) A consequences

The essence of that agent '·return." upon itselt.

3) F:irst explanation of that "return":

Subsisterlce-not being spread

through matter.
4) Second explanation:

Independence ot matter.

Here we meet a radically d1:f'terent way of speaking about the human soul.
The Neo-natonic description has the soul "bent back" on i tsalf in its

essence.

SUch a picture is suggestive to the jmagination, but it ia not ot

itself satisfying to the understanding.

However, it is clear that a familiar

principle governs the transit from the first part of the text to the second

part. The movement is according to the principle that the mode of operation
follows the mode ot being.

Thus, i f the soul :returns upon itself in ita

operation of' knowledge, it must. also be marked by a substantial or essential
return upon itself.
The fourth part of the text connects the Neo-Platonic description with

the :i.mmater1e.lity of the soul.

.FrClll what we saw above,31 this is pertinent to

the problem of the soul's habitual selt-knowledge.
Let us draw up the results of our study of the Commentaz:z 2! tbe

Sentence. into definite conclusions.
First, there is no proper sense in which the soul knows itself
continually. ThUll, habitual aelf'-lalowledge cannot mean continual selfknowledge in the human soul.

Secondly, the natural or:i.entation of the human intellect is to find its

31

ct. p. 23, above.

26
intelligible object in what is presented in phantasms.

Thus the soul. does not

have itself as a direct object of knowledge but must use a discursive process
in coming to know 'What it is.
Thirdly, two types of reflection have been noted:

a) the discursiw

return of the intellect to gain knowledge of its own nature-what it is J and
b) :immediate return by- which a man knows concomitantly with his operation that
the operation is taking place.

fourthly, the reason for the immediate reflection is the independence of
the soul from matter.

This last fact has also been described as a substantial

or essential return of the soul upon itself.
Along with these conclusions, ,. can point to four questions regarding
habitual self-knowledge Which call for a.nswers;

FirSt, is the habitual knowledge the soul has ot itself to be understood
as equivalent to the :i.mmateriality- of the soul?

Secondly', is the immediate reflection of the soul on its operations the
actuation of its habitual knowledge of itself.
Thirdly, is it possible to have knowledge that something is, apart from.
all knowledge of the nature of that thing?

This seems to be implied from the

distinction of the two kinds of reflection.
Fourthly, what is the complete explanation of these two descriptions of
the soul a a) "present to 1taelf," and b)"essentia~ returning upon itselt"?
How are these phrases to be connected with the habitual knowledge the soul has
of itself?
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Those are the questions we will seek to answer in our stuctv of the De
Veritate.

First, we will seek to expose the general principles governing all

knowledge and especially all reflective knowledge.

Then, we will turn to our

study of habitual self..-knowledge in the human soul. 32

32we must explain the

omission of De Veritate, 1, 9, a passage in which
St. Thomas surely does treat of the knowerts knowledge of himself. We pass it
owr in this thesis since it describes a special instance of reflection on the
nature of the soul. According to this text, along with the scientific study of
the nature of the soul, we must include the knowledge of the nature of one t s
knowing power which is had in every judgment. It is of the natUl"$ of the
j~nt that the intellect come to an imxnediate grasp of itself as a knower.
In its act, the mind knows its own dynamic quality. This is more than
perception ot the existence of oneta operation. But it is not formal
scientific knowledge of the nature of the intellect and of the soul. All St.
Thomas points to is that the mind judging of reality knows itself as a being
In.ade to know what is. This is beyond the scope of our study of the bab! tual
disposition underlying the soul's knowledge of its own existence.

CHAPTER III

_

THE DE .............................
VERITATE:

GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF AU.

KNOWLEOOE AlIiD SELF-KNOWLEDGE

In this chapter we will examine the articl.es on divine and angelic selfknowledge in the
which. guide

st.

£! _Ve_ri
........
ta....te
.... wi.th the

sSm of singling out the general principle

Thomas in working out his explanation ot each of these

subjects. We will then put these principles to use in the next chapter in
elaborating a complete explanation of habitual self-knowledge in the human
soul..
In taking up the question of God IS ¥..llOwledge of Himsel:r,

st.

Thomas

indicates that his solution is to begin with an absolute consideration of the
requirements for knowledge itselt.

"UMe ad oonsiderandum. qualitcr Deus

seipsum cognosoat, oportet videre per quam naturam aliqu:1.d 8i t cognoacens et
1
cognitum.."
The first step is a discUS'sion in cler-.r and simple terms of what

knowledge is, considered according

one

~

to its ontological purpose. Knowledge is

for a creature to increase its perfection Over and above the perfection

it has as a member ofa particular species.
The problem is that of the ontological. limitation of created beings.

1ne
- Ver.,
-

2, 2 c.
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moo

Sed. quia esee apec1t1cUM urdua rei eet d.1st.:t.nct. ab e_ . .
alterius rei, ideo in qlUl.l.1bet re creata hu1uamodi perteetion1
babitae in unaquaque 1'&, tantum deeat de pertectlone Irl.mpl.iciter,
quantum pertectius jn allis spec1ebWs 1nven1turJ ut ctt1usllbet rei
perteot1o in 88 conaideratae sit 1mperfec:ta, veluti para tot1_
perfectionia univers1, quae consurgit ex s1.:ngul.arulll rerum
peJ"teotioD1bua, irt9'ioem congrepUs.2
!he solution

to this ontological l.bd tat10n 1s k:novledge, by ltbioh one

creature can approprlt\te to 1t_l1' the proper perfeotions belc:mp.ng to other

things.
Uncle ut hula imper.fee~,on:1 aliquod remedimn & • • t, invenitur aliua
modus periectionis in mbwi oreet,1s, secundum quod Pl~rfectiO quae
••t proptt1a urdu rei, in altera re 5..m7enitur. et haec eat
perteetio cognoscenti. in quantum est cognoscana, quia secundum hoc
a oogno.oente al1qu1d Cogno80itur quod ipsum cogni tum. aliquo modo
est apud oognoacentem.3

From this int.ro4uct1on to the probla at hlUld, we can learn something about
the place held 1n the mind of st. 1bomaa 'qy auch a question 'u.

selt-knowledge. We

&\!lIM

in these

tete

OUl"8

of h'l.'llM

1bf.!t knowledgu 1. titte4 into a

teleologicel achele of un1wl"Al JII"OPGl"tiONJ. The knowledge spoken of iI
lIho~

objective.

objec~

It fuUm. 1ta function in flsaimllat1.ng other being....

the lmo_r and thus caJ"rying h1m along to greater perf'ectton.

Even

po....aion of the vnole urdWirM in 1:.h1s manner ia not too great an acll1e...-nt

for the human lP1r1t.h By some, jut such a conquest of realit.y ia posited

_.

2Ib1d

NI

the goal of human life.

hmmlt

a.1'8

Questd.ona of the

wbjen'" conaoioua

relegated to a seeondar.r 1eftl

From treatment oJ: t.he

put"J:IOIIG

po~n

importance.S

ot

of ln1OW'l.edr,.,

st.

11u:au goes on to a

of

_.raJ

consideration of the mode of ita realimtion. liov Will the known perfection be
fit

the same t:!me in the kIlower and in its proper subject?

It cannot b!a

aaeim1lated aocording to the __ determined .,de ot ex1atenoe which it ha$ in

tbe nat\tral 8Ub3ect. It I1U8t be ir£ the

~r

8a'lIIehow without its natural

determins;id.on.6

Thus, with brevi-v and careful d1rectuea., st. '1l1OJUlll has caae to the
point, of stating the pr1msJ7 pr1noiple governing ell the 1.netanee. of
knowledge,

Itt'
qu1a tonue ot periect10nee
est quod aeoundum hoc eet ali.qua

mater:t_

~ur,

1nde
1... cognoscib1l18 secundum quod a
materia I/I8PIU"8tur. Unde oporte' quod.tam 1d 1n q_ ~_ 1ial18
1'81 perteebio..,sit imrulterialeJ _si enim 8sset _terlale, pertect10
~ . . .t in GO ~ aliqUod . . . detel'ld.natull, et ita !IIJD
enet 111 eo secumun quod est cognoscibil1aJ so1licet pt."out, ex:iatena
perfect10 untus cat nata. . . . '.n al.tero.7
nt1'UIa pel"

'rhe tiNt cons1derat.ion ie that the dtltem1nation of forme and pertect.1ofla
18 by _tter.

The conclWl1<m :1a that knowab1l1ty demand.B 118parat1on bcm

SmUll st. ~s ~rlaJ in In IX Hat ... 11, n. 2617, OHie videtur
princ1pal1e actio, ut al1qu1. 1nt.e"1lipnntelligib1le. Quod autem al1qtd..
intell!gat _ 1ntell1gere intelligibile, hoc v1detur e888 praeter princtpalaa

aotum, quaa1 aooeaaoriurn quoddam."
~• •

6aPerteot1o

a\1.tellt uni'WJ :rei in altere. e.. non poteat seound.'um detendnat\ll\
Ula, et ideo ad boo q'l»d nata sit . _ in 1"8 altera,

quod babe, :in roe

Dportet au considerare absque hie quae nata aunt

2 o.

Mm

detominare." De Vcr., 2,
--
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determining mat.ter.

Regarding the power to know, the conclusion is parallel:

a knower must be a receiver ot pertections.

an immaterial manner.

The reception rrmst. take place in

The reason appears :in considering how matter receives

a perfection according to one determined mode of existence and

80

rules out the

otherness ot the form which is received in knowing.

A first conclusion of this part of our study is that things have the power

to know proportionately to their immater:i.a1ity: "secundum ord.5.nem
.
8
immaterial1tatis in rebus, secundum hoc in eis natura cognitionis invenitur."
The same proportion is found concerning the knowabill ty of things:

"Similiter

est etiam ordo in COgnoscibilibus.u 9
A brier general application at this principle shows that the universe is

divided into things only potential.ly knowable and things of themselves
knowable.

The things potentiaJ,q knowable require the operation ot agent

intellect upon them to render them immaterial and thus apt for assimilation in
knowledge.

St. Thomas adds that the immaterial things, though more knowable by

their nature, ere less knowable by us,10 since, as .. haft seen, the hllDlan
11
mind is by' nat1ll"e orientated to take its object fr(ll1 sensible things.

lO"Sed res immateriales aunt inte1ligibiles per seipsasJ unde aunt magis
nota.e secundum naturam, quamvis minus notse nobis. If Ibid.

11ct. p. 17, a.bove.

-
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The conclusion of the article is brief.

God, as purely spiritual, is at

once the supreme knower and the most knowable being.
nature is

who~

Thus, His existing

knowable and knowing. The perfect identity of the objective

and subjective requirements for knowledge r,rounds the perfect self-grasp which
is God's knowledge of Himsel:t .12

'!his is the first application of the

universal principle that knowledge is proportionate to immateriality on the
part of both subject and object.
In the a.nswer to the second opinion in this same article, st. Thomas gives

----.........

an explanation of the tiber de Causie proposition on self-knowledge, "Omnis
sciens essent1am est redians ad essentiam suam red! tiona completa. n We shall
study the text in detail since it is the definitive statement St. Thomas makes
on his understanding of the proposition.1)
The objection proposes on the authority of the Liber

.2!

Causis that

Ii

thing which knows its own essence must experience a complete return-reditio

12ltQuia igitur Deus est in rine separat10nis a materia, cum ab omni
potent1alitate sit penitus imtnunisJ relinquitur quod ipse est max:ime
cognoscitiws, at max1me oognoscibilis. tt Ibid •
.

-

llrhe tw:o places where the proposition appeared in the Comment!;lZ on the
sentences were llteral synopses of the proposition and its eipta!iation
the'
tiber
Cawsi.. In De Veritate, 1, 9, it is used to substantiate the
d8scription of the re'?reetive powers of intellectual beings, but the proposition is not explained. The explanation found in S. T., I, 14, 2 ad 1, synopsized the explall8tion found here in the De Veri tate.- The Summa text shows
some wrbal preeis.1ons: "Dicendum quod redire ad essentiam suarn. nihil aliud
est quam rem subsistere in seipsa. Forma en1m, inquantum perrieit rnaterism
dando ei esse, quodammodo supra ipsam effunditur; in quantum vero in seipsa
habet esae, in seips8IIl redit. Virtutes 19:i.tur cognoscitivae quae non aunt
subs1stentes, sed actus aliquorum organorum, non eognoscunt seipsas, siout
patet in singul1s sensfbus. Sed virtutes aognosei tivae per Be subsistentes
cogIlOscunt seipsa•• " We will take up the content of St. Thomas' Commentary on
the tiber .2! _Ca
...u...s....i ....
s in Chapter V.

a:e

rn

3.3
OOPlPleta-upon its own essence.

However, in God there can be no return upon
Thus, 1..t self

the essence, since in no way does God go out away from H:l.mselt.

knowledge must involve this return, there can be no eelt-knowledge in God.

In the first part ot the answer to the opinion, St. Thomas explains the
metaphorical way in whioh the return must be understood.

The first part of

his explanation concerns understanding as such and not just as found in God.
Ad secundum dicendum quod locutio haec qua dicitur, quod seiens
ee, a.d eS8entiam SU8m. redit, est loeutio metaphorical non enim in
inteUigendo 8st motus, ut probatur in nll Phlsieo~. Dnde ~C;
proprie loquendo, est fbi recessus aut reditus; sed pro tanto d1citur
esse proQ!tpsus vel motus, in quantum ex uno oOgIlOscibili pervenitllr
ad a11ud.lh
St. Thous then proceeds to show how the proposition can be a.pplied to

desoribe the disoursi"" type ot refiection found in the knowledge a man has
or his own soul.

However, this use of the proposition to describe nU-

knowledge cannot be applied to Oodt
Sed in nobis proeesSUJI vel motus tit per quemdam discursum, secund:um
quem est exitus 8t reditus in.an:imaJn nostrmn, dum oognoscit seipsam.
Primo autem actus ab ipsa exiens teminatur ad objectum; et deinde

reflectitur super actum.; at delnde super potentiam at essentiam,
secundum quod actus eognoscuntur ex objectis et potentiae per actus.
Sed in divina cognitione non est aliquis disoursus, ut prius diotum
est quasi per notum in ignotum deftniat.15
The final part of the answer gives the basic explanation of what this

return upon one'. essence really is.

~~\stow~
V

140e Ver.,
--

l'

LOYOLA

.,..~\

UNIVERSITY

2, 2 ad 2.

L/8RAR--(

l'Ibid. A posBible type or discursive MOvement in God is seen in
consider.J:'iig the objects ot his knowledge. Considering creatures. God rinds
a likeness to H:J..msf!l£ and thus is brought back to His own essence again where
He views these creatures in the first place.

34
Sed tamen sciendum, quod reditio ad essentiam in libro de Caus1s
n:illil aliud dici tur nisi subsistentia rei in seipsa. F"O'rmae errllu
in se non subsistentea, aunt super al1ud eftusae et nul.lat.enus ad
seipsas colleetae; sed formae in se subsistentes ita ad res alias
effunduntur, ea, pertieiendo .. vel eis intluendo, quod in seipsas
per Be ma.nent. l6
Here, in St. Thomas' e:xplanation, as in the actual text of the Liber
Causis,

17

~

the return involved in selt-knowledge is the ground for explaining

the mode of being of the knower which is capable of sud>. a return.

The value

of the present explanation is that it is a causal explanation based on the
relation of a form to its reeepti V8 subject.
The subsistent form. is lIholly self-eontaj ned, and remains so through all
its operations_

If a form is received in a subject, it loses this quality

ot

self-comaimnent and is spread out through another principle to fom a
composite being.
thus St. Thomas turns the :i.maginative conception of the Nee-Platonic
movement of a being back upon i tseU into an ontological explanation based on
the mode of being of subsistent forms.

Once the proposition hu been explained in this manner, we f!nd that it
can be applied to God:

It

secundum hunc modum Deus max:1me ad essentiam su.am

red!t, quia omnibus providens, ac per hoc quodammodo in omnia exiens et

16Ibid•

above.

Ct. the parallel passage from ~.

1_,

I, 14, 2 ad 1, p, 34" n. 13,

17 or. pp. 26-27, above, for St. Thomas' paraphrase of the text and our
analysis of the argument found in the commentary on the tex:t..

procendens .. in _ipso .f'ixua at :1mmixtu ~ ••18

We 'W'tll mow ahead now to consider
lcnowlsd.ge 1n the fll'lge18 in .De
Venta.,
...
d
Fl'

st.

'l'hamaa' expl.am.tion ot

~at1on

find fa treatment of the .... uni\lC'8al charaoter
the qu_Uon

ot

.1£.

F!1r:bt, Article S1x. Uera_
.

we found. in the approach to

God •• aelt-knowledge, the conclusion is an tlpplicat1ol'l of the

prendaee to the pecullar ontolog1cal s:ttuation of the angels.
!be

~

of the &rt1ole take. u

bet1ll88n operat.ional

operations, wh.-1m

8l'e

ita point, of departure the d:i.ati::.otion

transient operat1cm., Which ohange anotherJ and bDanent
perfectiona in the agent. The a1m 11 to eol.. the

d1tt1oul.ties proposed in tba third .net e.ightb op1n1onas against tbe poaaib1l1ty
of

_1t~

1n the angels.

Both of the_ difficulties

are balled on the proposed principle that in

knowledge the knowr and known are related u

same tb.tng _IMt be both agctnt

mxt patient

be a knOwing subject. graap1nt; itself' in
part

ot its

&'1

agent and pat1ent-I ? Since the

1."1 an operation,. M

sct of lmowlodge.

~1

cannot

.Perhaps with one

being an angel can ~ to lmow aoot.htir ptWt, but tJle stated

principle will excll'da knowledge

or

631 Eu~~l t 8

l4bole being by 1 tselt •

l8n. 'er., 2, 2 ad 2. The appl1caMon is not restr:lcted to God's knowledge ~, but is made in a generalmallnm,- to f11a operations on all.
creatu.ree. The appl1cl'ition ot the principle in the SUII'l!8
empbui• • God's return in kllc'td.llg Himself. "Per se tlutem sam-:Fe max_
comenit Dec. Unde aecundum htulC modum loquendi ipse est maximo red1ena ad
e ••mti.81 __ et cognoacens aeipaal'll. ft §.. I., I, llt.. 2 ad 1.

Theolofie-

lI-Praeterea, idem non poteflt ea. age.ns et patane, movena at motum, nisi
hoc modo QUOd una pm'S eiue dt. mavens wl agens, et a11a mota wl paesaJ ut
pa:tet in animal1bus, ut, probatur in VIII !aY!ieorum. f:ed 1nte~fm8 et
1ntell.ectm .. babent ut &gen. et PfAtien8. &gO nonpotest ease ut angelus
totum ., intel11ge.t... --.B! V~X: •• 8, 6 arg. 3.

The fint point. _de after the initial distinction of transient and
i~nt

operat.lona 18 t.&t operations of both k1nd8 require that the subject,

muet be in act 1n the line 1n 'fIi'l1ch he oporat....

"Has autam d1.1a:8

actAOne8

in

hoc coxmmlunt quod ultraque non progred1 tur n181 e.b exietente 1 n actu,
seowx!ta quod est ..ow. If
The

,.xt point 1a

20

the explanation at 1cnawledge . . an imJ:;anent ope.ratlon

prooee41ng fIoJa t.be unton

ot

knowar and know.

Actio aute. appet1 tus et eenaua e\ intel.l..ectus mD eat a10ut aot1o
propoediens in ma1:.eriam exter!tJJ:'S, 8Od. siout actio consistene in lpao
aa-nte, ut pertectlo ejueJ at ideo oportet quod lntellifPns"
_cundum quod. i.ntell1g1t" 81t actuJ non ~uteM oporte\ quod.
1ntelllgendo 1ntell1gene a1t ut agefl8, ~ntel1eetum ut p.u,sum. Sed
inteUlgena et i.nt,ellect'UM, prout ex e18 est e£tectum unum quid,
quod eat :hrt..el14ctus in acta, nnt 'Ull'ta pr1ncip:t:um buius actus qui
est. inte1l:1gere. 21
Thus the k:nower 1s not alone the aGent, If.inee he i8 not in aet as a knower
batore the union with the known object.

Consequent on this union, the

:tntellect 1n act-power completed by object-1s the single source of the act

ot

lmottl.ed.ge.

The union ot knowr and known can be had 1n t.vo different

.aaenoe

ot

W'I!J1'81

by the

the known bei.ng joined to the knower or by a 11kene8s being so

joined. Now 1.t can happen that action and passion MY be mCCt8Bal"Y to bring

about t.he union of intellect and intelligible object. Thua 1n human knowledge
the agent InteUcct 1"e000rs the i ..nteU1g1ble species actual:q knowable, and

37
the possible intellect is a patient in receiving the species.

Hwe-ver this

action and passion is not knowledge, but only the way to knowledge.
The conclusion of this analysis is that knowledge follows on the union of

intellect with something which is in act in the intelligible order.

This is

the second major principle which we will use in explanation of habitual self-

knowledge :1.n the human

intelligibile in eo."

SOull

"Intellectus intelligit omne illud quod est actu

22

The rest of the exposition concerns the self-knowledge of an angel as
following from the presence of its essence,

w:hie..~

is in act in the intelligible

order, to its intellect, which consequently knows this intelligible object to
mich it is urdted.

It will be instructive to us to follow the steps of the

argument to see the way st. Thomas works out a comparison between the angel
and the human possible intellect.

'!'he first step is an explanation of how thi.ngs exist in the intelligible
order.

The second step is an expl.anation of operation in the intelligible

order.

In both parts st. Thomas draw the explic1t paral.lel between this

treatment of the intelligible order and the aspects of the entati'Ve order
which would be more

gener~

known

to his reader. The first part gives the

grades of intelligible being, trlS second, the modes of intelligible
operation.

1)

Sciendum est igitur, quod nihil prohibet esse Illiquid
actu unum et in potentia alterum • • • .; et similiter est
possibi1e aliquid esse actu ens, quod in genera intell1g1billum est potentia tantum. Sicut enim est gradus actus at

38
potentiu in entibus, quod aliqt.dd eat potentia tantU1l, ut
materia prlma; aliquid 8C\U tantum, ut Deus; all.quid sow
. , potentia u\ omnia 1ntermediaJ sic eat in genere inteUigib1li_ allquid ut actu tantum, ee1licet esamtia d1v1naJ
aliquid ut potentia tantum, ut intellectus possib1.lis • • • •
OXl'lrlns autem substantiae angellou aunt mediae, habente.
aliquid de potentia e\ aetu, non solum in genere ent1un, eed
etiam :tn ge:nere 5.nt.el.ligibilium.

2)

Siout 19itur materia prima non pot,est agere al1quam
aot1onam nili pertlciatur per f'Omatl, ( i t tunc actio Ula est
queedam emanat10 tOl"lnU ipsiUIIJ magi. quam materiae. rea autea
exi8tAmte. aatu poar:\U'lt agere actionem aeeunc.tum quod fJWlt
actuJ ita intellectus po••ibilla noster nihil poteet intelligere anteqUllll pert;. aiatur forma intellig1b1l1 in &otu.
Tunc enhl 1ntell1g1 t z-. cu1us est illa torma, nee poteat _
intelligere mill! per fonnam intelligib1lem actu in ..

extate!1tem. IntelJ.ect.ua vero angeli, quia habet eamtian
quae oat ut actus in genere intelligibUium., sibi p:raeaentaa,.
poteet inteU1gere 1d quod est intelllgibile apud 1.paun,
IJC1licet es.ntism sue, non ~r aliquam sim1litud1nefl'l, ae4

per •••nt1an.23

The erueial point in the first part of the explanation is that the

angela a.re in act (though not in

ptU"8

act) in U18 intelligible order. The

second mowment of explanation brlngs us to the eonclli8ion that an
know8 itsel.t"

~

since its own easenee 1. in act. jn the :1ntell1g1ble order and

natural.l.;v united with its 1ntelleet. 'thus our second prlnc'.ple governing
krXni1edge is applied perfectly

~o

the ea_ of angelic selt-knowledge.-a

be1ll

lunderstand.ing 'l;.het 'Ii1jeh ie wn.ted with lt.e intellect and in act in the
intelligible order.

We also haft a further explanation Which shows why there 1. no continual

aelf-knowlcxlge in the hu.man soul.

The reason i:l in the

r't3ture

ot

tJle possible

23Ib14• ct. Chart I, p. 39, for a acbemati.c treatment of the oompar180ruI
made int:'bIs passage.
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CHART I
SCHEMATIC ANALYSIS

IN

I.

or

ANGELIC SEI:F-KNOWLEDGE

!! _VE....:lU
.....;.;;TA..TEii i iJ,

Comparison ot orders B;cco,rdirys
Entat1ve Order

8, A. 6

Q.

.:!2 beipB:
I

Intelligible Order

God (actu
tantum)
_..;;.;.0.,
............

t

1. Divine Essence (actu tantum)

2. Prime Matter
C{!2tent1a tantum)

I

2.

). All intermediate

,

.3. Angelic Substances

1.

----

Peenble Intellect
Cp!tent:1a tantum)

(habentes aliquid
.2! e>tentia !! ~

existing thinge
(.!2!! !! E2tent1a)

n.

Comparison of orders aecordi15
Entatift Order
1.

Pr1me Mattera. can act only when
perfected bY' torm.

.!e wration,
I

Intelligible Order

I

1. Possible Intellecta, can understand onq when
perfected by intelligible

tora.

b,

b.

action is of the
tom more than of
the matter.

2. Beings in actcan act in the line
in which they are in
aot.

understanding is of the

natural subject ot the
form; $" f -knowledge is
consequent and seoondar,y.
I

2. .Angelic inte Uec\understands that wIlich is in
aot and united wi th itself,

i.e., its own es.nee.
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intellect:

it is bereft of an intelligible object until the agent. intellect

performs its :tunction of abstraction and illumination on a phanta.8m. We will
work out the consequences ot this nee.ssi ty in the next chapter in handling
the causes of the habitual knowledge the buman soul. has of itselt.
In response to the fifth opinion opposing the possibUity ot selfknowledge in the angel we see our first governing principle brought into
action.
The major premise of the argument in the opinion is exactly the principle

we found operatiw in explaining the necessity of
Himself,

God having knowledge of

"Nihil intelligi tur nisi secuncb.:a quod denudatur a materia et a

conditionibu8 material1bus. ft24 The minor premise proposes that being-inpotency is a material condition from which one can never separate the angelic

essence and therefore this essence is not knowable.
The anawr is that the material conditions 'Which prevent knowledge are
those which restrict natural forms to determined material dimensions.

Thus

there is no need for separating an angel £rom the poten.cy- found in it, since

it is not the potency of a determined and extended material object. 2S The
implied conclusion is the correct applioation of the first governing principle
of knowledge:

24Ibid.,

-

since the angelic essence is comp1etel1' immaterial, it 18 of

arg.

2$Ibid.., ad.

-

S.
S.

:ttselt knowable.

26

By way of conclusion to this chapter let us brietly' review the two
governing principles of knowledge derived from

st.

Thomas' expositions of

divine and angelic self-knowledge.

The first principle is that both the power to know ar.d the capacity to be
known require ilaateriality.

Here is the statement of the disposition or mode

of being required before knowledge can take place. As we saw, the source of
this principle was tJle consideration of knowledge as the way in which some.
beings can as.imUate greater perfection.

That this aS8imilation take place,

it i8 absolutely necessary that it take place immaterially, or the tbole
meaning of knowledge as of "the other" is denied.

'!he second principle was that a knower understands whatever i8 actual.ly
knowable, and united with his intellect.
immateriality,

must have:

This describes the effect of

actual knowability'J and the relation which subject and object

identity, t.hrough essence or speeies.

We Will turn now to work out a full explanat:ton of the habitual knowledge
the human soul hal of itself, keeping these two governing principle. in view.

2~u. st.

Thomas also explains in the course of treating the knowledge
an angel has ot another angel. The context is a reference to their self'knowledge: ttTunc enim non oportet quod sit aliud forma in intellectu, et
foma qua res in se subsisUt J eo quod ipsa forma qua talls res in H
SUbsistit! est intelligibilis in actu propter immunitatem suam a materia."

-De

Ver.,

6,

1 c ..

CRAPI'ER IV

-----

IN mE DE VERITATE

The a1m of this chapter is to reach an exact understanding of the

hnbi tual knowledge ot itself.

paragraph in the De Veritate in which

Our first consideration is

st.

Thomas describes the hu:ma.n soul's

to determine the exaot S'llbject ot discussion in
The lilole ot
-this subjeot
we can

the article. What is to be unierstood by the tem mens?
tenth question ot the

B!. Veritate

1s concerned with

the

1

and

find the detini tion we seek in the first article of the question.

-

The nominal origin of the word mens regarding the human soul is the tact
tha.t the soul has a mansura within itself in first principles. In knowing, the
soul can be said to measure things by these principles. 2 The tact is that
these principles are implicitly operative in every jUdgment.' Thus,!!!!. has tc
do with the intellectual faculty.

st.

Th01l'/8.8 .further explains that whenever the name of a power comes to be

lThe title«

"De Mente, In Qua Est Imago Trinitatis."

2"Nomen mentis hoc dioitur in anima" siout at intellectus. Solum enb1
intellectu8 aceipit cogntt1onem de rebus mensurando eas quasi ad sua
principia." De Ver., 10, 1 c.

--

3"Aliqua naturaliter eognosc1mus ut per se nota, ad quae omnia alia
examin.am.us secundum sa de omnibus judieantes." Ibid., 10, 8 o.

-

used tor the subject of that power, the name is alway. taken from the highest
power of the thing in question. 4

-

The conclusion ot the article is tr..at mens either denotes the highest
power of the soul, or it is used regarding the

eS8el108

ot the soul,

and then i

denotes the eseenee preoisely aa the aou.rce ot the highest powere'
In answering the various argumnts proposed in the question,

-

makes some further precialona of the meaning of mens.

-

st.

Thomas

In answer to the second

argument be shoW'll that mens includes more than just the intelleot. He calls

it rtquoddam genua potentiarum, ut sub mente intell1gantur comprebendt

OmDeS

ill.ae potent1ae quae in suia aotlbus omnino a materia et eonditionibus

materiae recedunt."6 The reason for this inclusion of the will is that it enjoys the

S811le

dignity and supremacy among the soults powers as the intellect

s:lnce both have equally universal objects.

St. Thomas again adds that the

-

name mens can also ref"er to the soul precisely as the source

It we now turn to the introductory paragraphs ot

ot

the.. two

!!!. Veritate,

10, 8, we

-

can determine exactly how mens is used in thia article. The first step in

4nEt ideo si aliqua. res per suam potentlam debeat designari, oportet quod

designatur per ultimum potent1ae suae. lt

-

Ibid., 10, 1 c.

SUEt sic mens, prout in ea est imago, nom:1na.t potentiam animae et non
essentiamj vel s1 nominat essentiam, hoc 8at nisi inquantll1l ab ea nult tali.
potentia." ~.
6xb1d., ad 2. In arunrer to the ninth opinion mens is further explained
as a general power of the soul having di..f.'ferent powers-as its parts.

7Ibid., ad 8.

-

St. Thomas' exposition is to cl.ari1'y the meaning of
question posed at the head of the article:

~ essenti~

in the

"utrum mens seipsam per essentiam

cognoscat an per aliquam speci_."

--

-

Per eSlent1am suam does not refer to the object of knowledge, as it the

question were whether we know the essence or only the accidents of the soul.
The present question refers to the mediUDl ot our knowledge ot the soul. What
is partieularll' significant is the way St. Thomas at least nominalJ¥ bypasses

-

the question regarding mena and takes the soul (anima) as the subject

whole discussion.

ot the

Al10 modo ut referatur ad id quo eognosciturJ et siC intelligitur
aliquid per essentiam cognosci, quia ipsa essentia est quo
cognoscitur. Et hoc modo ad praesens quaeritur, utrum anima per
essentiam inteUigat se.
Ad cuius rei evidentiam, notandum est, quod de anima duplex
eognitio
poteet ab unoquoque, ut Augustinus dicit in ix!!!.

,beri

Tr1n1tate.

Thus we can conclude hom the substitution ot anima that the subject of
the article il the soul itsel.f.

The precise intention would seem to be to

-

the second way in which mens was explained in the first article in this tenth
question.

Thus, we are dea.l.iftg with the 80ul as the source, or ontolOgical

subject, trom which the powers of intellect and. will proceed.
The next point in our approach to the article is to point out the Wo

types ot knowledge of the soul that are possible.
knowing the nature

ot the soul and

knowing

The distinction is betwen

its ex5.stence, as we saw in the

8
Ibid., 10, 8, c. Italics added. Anma is used through the body ot the
article, With two exceptions, until the conclusion.
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Co:mmentarr
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~

sentences:

9

Duplex cognitio haberi 110test ab unoquoque, ut Augustinus dicit in
ix ~ Trinitate. Una. quidem, qua uniuscuiusque anima se tantum
cognosei t quantum ad id quod est ei proprium; et alia qua.
cognoscj,tur anima quantum ad id quod ow,bus animabus est commune.
Illa enim cognitio quaa commtmiter de omni anima he.betur, est
quo cognoscitur animas natura; eogn5tio vero quam quis ha.bet de
anima quantum ad id quod est sibi proprium, est cognitio de anima
secundum quod habet esse in ta~i indjviduo. Unde per bane
cognitionem cognoscitur an est Mima, sicut cum aliquis perc:l.pit Be
habere a.nilntIm; per alima varo cognitionem scitur quid est anima., at
quae sunt per se accidentia eius.10
The last named approach is expL,:lined :i.n the second half of the exposition
as based on a dis curs i ve reasoning process proceeding from the objects of the

soul's operative powers.

'l'ms proceeds the philosophical investigation which

ends in knowledge of the conlmon nature and properties of the soul.

st. Thomas

repeats the compf.rison of the intellect w.ith prime matter to indicate why such
a discursive process is necessary.

11

Just as prime matter is only known

through our knowledge of form, so the intellectual power is known through the
perfections of other beings received in knowledge.12
The second way of knowing the s. ul is for an individual to come to know
t.b.at he has a soul:

ttsicut cum nliquis percipit

BEl he.b€~re

knowledge is then shown to take place at two levels:

-

-

9In III Sent., 23, 1, 2 sol.

lone Var., 10, 8 c.

--

12

De Ver.,
-

10, 8 c.

animam."

This

that of actual knowledge

Cf. pp. 1[1-21 above.
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and that of hab:ltual knowledge.

For the purpose of easily dlstjnguishing the

rea.soned knowledge of the soults nature and the perceived knowledge of the
soul's existence, we 1611 use the term. "understanding" to denote t.lJe former
and "awnreness" to denote the latter.

This usage is roughly equivalent

to

tllilt of illtelli&E;re and eercipere :i.n the text of St. Tb.omas.
St. Thomas then explains that this a'Vlareness,

~:t

the level of actual

knowledge, does not require a discursive process, but is had directly and
without a logical mediunl.

I t occurs in the awareness of t.he soul's activities

which is concondtant with the activities themselves.

The implication is that

in our operatlons we are aware tht;',t we do operate and this awareness involves

awareness of the soul wh:l.ch :1.8 operating.

Thus,:in the first part of his

fourfold an8'Her to the question posed in the article, st. Thomas says that
actual aWSJ."eness of the soul is had through the operations of the soul:
Quantum igitur ad actualem cognitionem, qua al1quis considerat se
in actu animam habere, sic dico, quod anjm.a cognosc:ttur per actus
sues. In hoc enirn al:lquis perc:i.pit se anim.am habere, et vivere, et
esse, quod perc5.pit se sent ire et :tr.telllgere, et alia huiusmodi
vitae opera exercere.13

A striking contrast between the t;Yl'es of knowledGe of the soul-wawareness
and understanding--is the absolute certainty of one t s awareness of the

existence of his soul comp:n:-ed with the diffj.culty of understanding the nature

13Ibic1 •

-
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of the soul.

14

From this comparison we can learn something about the content of our
awareness of the soulls existence.

:,je

can put t..ne question in th:ls fasMon:

What is affirmed a.s ex1.st:1.ng in the judgment which results fran this actual
awareness?
It

The subject of the affirmation cannot be understood to be the

form of the body," or

II

some i.m.mater:tal principle. ft

are known only in understandj.ng the nature

These aspects of the soul

ot the soul and are gained through

the process of discursive jnvsstigation.
In the text

:5. t

was stated thElt this awareness of the soul is involved :in

the awareness that one is acting :i.n a part:i.eular way.

The awareness of the

soul is then an implication, though an implication about wh1ch we haw
complete certainty.

It follows thpt, just a,s one comes to aff:5rm, ttl know

this thing; I sense th2.t thing I live,'t from the awareness of hi.s acts, so one
would come to affj.I'm, "'!'here is in :me the source of knoldng, the souree of
sensing, and the source of life. If
soul in a vague and general manner.

The latter is implied, and it :lndicates the
v-!e must r:i.gorously exclude from the

notion of this source any content 'beyond a most primitive idea of someth:ing
t<lhieh operates.

It cannot be specH'ied as wb.olly :1der..tical with the

~rsonJ

Jli.ftSecundum hoc scient:i-a de an:i.Ina est certissima., quod unusquisque in
seipso experitur se animrun hahere, et actus animae si.b1 inesse; sed eogno8cere
quid sit .anima difficillimum est." Ibid., ad 8 in contr. Also: " Nullu8
erravit unquam i,n hoc quod non pereiperet se vivere, quod pertinet ad
cognitionem qua aliquis percipit quid in anima qua agatur; secundum quam
cognitionem dictum est quod anima. per essentiam suam cognoscitur in habitu."
Ibid., ad 2.

-
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or u being e. d.1..stinct part ot hiflh

Nothing of its nature or properties can

be attimed; all that. ,. make 1s an affirmation :In all certainty tluit tilis

source does ex1st.15 The ground of the e.i'firmntion :i.e the actual perception

of th5.s source operati.ng in some deflnite way.
'Which ... most. coamonly meet. this

e}~enoo

We mtght add that the way in

is in the certainty we haw,

consequent on our acts, thst some act of our did take place.

hhat St. Tho!'a&s

is pcdnt5ng out is that the perception ot "me operating*' is in rea.l1t:r a. per-

oepti-on of the soul operating, eventhourJl a man cannot formulate the
ol.1talof;icnl :relationship

at suppoa1t, tormnl principle, anti operative

~r

in

the human operations which he daiq perfoms.

W. can tur11 to the aecencl type of awa:reness

or

the soul's existence.

Sed quantUDl ad cognitiotel hab1tualem, 8j,c dice, quod an:tma per

essentiam suam Be v.tdet, id est ex hoc ipso quod assentia sua est
sib:1, praeeens, eat p::>tena ox1re in actun cogflitionis sui ipaiWlJ
siout aliquis ex hoc q\1od bnbet eliCltlus 8cdentiee habitum., ex
ipsa. prae_nM.a habitus, eat poterus percipere illa quae 8ubfmnt
illi hab1tu1. Ad 1100 aute.m quod perc:lpi.at a."1ima se *,81!1O, et quid
in seip... agat.ur attendat, non requ1r1t\1r aliqlds habitus; sed ad.
hQc auf't1cit sola essentia animae, qUM ment1 est. prafU:M)t18, ex ea
en1ln a~8 progred:1untur, jn quibua actual1ter ipsa percjpitur.16
Tbe fb-et thing to 1:e pointed out in the paragraph is that tw relationships am established.

First the notion of habitual eeU-awarel185. is

1$1n thls explanat::lon of actual aelt-aWl"'E'tt1eS8 of the soul, we haw
tollawed J. Fegha1re, C.S .Sp., !ntellectus at IktM.o solon saint Thomas d t,Aguin
(lWis-Ottawa, 1936), pp. 2Oh..~.
b - . ,

16ne Vcr., 10, 8 c.

--

,

•• -

-
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developed by the phrase "essentia animae est sibi praesens."

Secondly, this

state of 'be:1.ng present to itself constitutes the power the soul has to come to
be actual1\v aware of itself.'

j

n the Inal'lIlflr deseribd above.

Thus two

equ1valences are made:
1)

CoSJ}itio habitual1~

•

Essentia a.nimae
~

2)

•

Essentja al1imae
~ praesens

praesens

Potentia ut anima.

!!. ~ cogroscat

In the fj.rst equivalence we see that habitual self-knowledge is a disposition
of the soul, a pertjcular mode of be:1ng.

In the second, it :1.s stated that

this disposition or state of the soul rr.a.kes the soul capable of se1fawareness in its operations.

We will take up t.,hree approaches to t.he passage to gain a full understanding of what exactly this disposition of the soul is.

First, we will

examine the import of' the comparison vlith an intellectual hf?bit.

Secondly,

we will apply the general princ:l.ples on knowledge to the human soul

how the state of self.'-presence merits the name of knowledge.
work out an analysis of the

explan.~.tory

to see

Thirdly, we will

f:tnal sentence in the para.graph.

First, to the question of intellectual habits.

Habits, generall.y speak-

ing, are qualitative modifications of human powers which incline the power to
specific acts.17

In the intellectual povrer, a habi.t is a disposition of the

possible intellect to know a particular thing.

Intellectual habits are

constituted by retained intelligible spec:i.es which become more or less

171!! n

~., 24, 1, 1 501. and ~.1., I-II,

54, 1 c.

SO
permanent modifications of the possible intellect.18 The intellect with

retained knowledge stands mid-way between the :i.n!tiaJ. state of no determinatio
and the state of actual knowledge.

19

The general result of the oomparj_son is clear.

The state of the soul--

being present to it.self--est8blishes a disposition wid eh inclims the sou1 to
know it.self as acttng Wtlenever it does act.

cause actual knowledge.20 Still, there is

'The state does not immediately
:rIO

spec:l.es whl.ch sets up this

.

disposition; but Ule essence of the soul alone br-..lngs the state about..

21

The conclusion trot develops is that there is a definite parity between

the relation of the reted ned specj.es to the possible intellect and the

relat:lon of the essence of the soul to the intelleot.

Both are dispositions

18nSpec:les intelligibilcs In intelleotu possi.bili remanent post actua1em
cons:i_derationem, at herr-urn ordinatio est habitus scientiae. fI De Ver., 10, 2 c.

--

20rhus we have Emother point of similarity between an intellectual habit
and the power for awareness of the soul; just as selt-awareness is had only in
operations of knowing another thing, so a habit is actuated only when the
agent intellect illuminates a 'propor:l1antasm. "Cum phantasmata sa habent hoc
modo ad intellectum possib:t1em sicut sens:ibil:l.a ad sensum, • • • quantumcumque
aliquam speciem inte1l1giMlsl7l apud se habeat, nunqmllll truoon actu aliquid
considerat secundum ilium speciem, nisi convertendo se ad phantasmata. n De
Ver., 10, 2 ad 7.
-

-

21uIntellactus noster nihil e.ctu poteat intelllgere antequam a
phantamnatibus abstrahat; nee etiam pertest habere habitualem notitimn aJ.iorum.
a ee, quae scilicet in ipso non aunt, ante abstractionem praedictarn, eo quod
species e.l.iorum 1ntelligibilium non aunt e1 innatae. Sed essentia. sua. sibi
innata est; ut non eam necesse habeat a phantasmatibus aequirere; • • • at
ideo mens antequam t'. phantamnatibus a.batrahat, sui notitism habitu.alem habet,
qua. possit percipere Be esse." De Ver., 10, 6 ad 1.

--

for particular kinds of knowledf,'8:

the species for knO"W'ledge of "What it

represents, and the essence of the soul for knowledge of the soul's existence,
or as we were led to develop the point, for certain knowledge that there is in
the lmo-wer a principle of a determ:lned kind of act.
In moving to the second part of our explanation, we ask how this disposition of the soul can be called knowledge.' As we take up this point, it is
well to recall the frrune of reference within which we are m.oving in dealing
with human knowledge.

The central. point is what we spoke of earlier as the

orientation of the human knowing power to grasp its object throUP..h What it
finds in phantasms.

The point is of such ca.pital importance in st. Thomas'

work that we are sureq pointing to a defini t.e part of the intellect.ual
atmosphere SUlTound.i.ng the writing of this passage, by recalling it here.
We turn now to the question of how st. Thomas comes to call the soul's

essential state a kind of knowledge.

Our f:lrst gowrning principle of

knowledge is the proporMonallty between freedom

:fro1il

matter and knowledge.

Since it is established that the human soul is independent from matter, it is
demonstrated that the soul is graced with the power to know-it has a faculty'

of intellect. 22 A second conclusion would be that the soul is of itself

knowable, though of course not actually known since not reached through a

22It is to be noted that our procedure here is a do'WllWt'..rd movement ot
demonstration through causes. We a.ssume the temporally prior movement of
invention :trom percej:ved effects.

phantasm. 2.3
The second governing principle of knowledge is that know.tng follows on
the union of :i.nteUect with a thing 'Which is in act in the intelligible order.
What then do we have in the human soul?

There is surely no aboriginal. union

of intellect With something completely other than itself.

But there is a

constant union of intellect w:tth the soul, and this union is established and
preserved by the soul being the ontologicaJ. subject from Which flows the
intellectual power. 24

This then is the relation signified in saying that the

soul is present to itself. 25 The fact we face is that in the mind of St.

2lrhus the soul is classed with those th:tngs Wh1.ch st. Thomas calls
"intelligibiles per seipsasJ unde aunt magis nota.e secundum naturam, quamvis
minus nota.e nobis. 1t De Ver., 2" 2 c. Thus we come to agree with the
contention of Fr. GardeiI"'tb.at the reason for no continual awareness of the
soul is wholly from the necessary ll'IOde~f operat:i,on of the soul as .(he subject
o£~owledge. Cf."La perceptlon experimentale de ltame par eUe-melIne,"
l1elanges Thomistes (Kain, 192.3), p. 224.

24n 1ta atiam non oportet quod semper intelligatur actualiter ipsa mens.
cuius cognitio Ioost nobis habitualiter, ex: hoc quod ipsa eius assentia
intellectui nostro est praesens." De Ver., 10., 8 a.d 11. Italics added. On
the reciprocai relation: "intellecnviPotentia est fonna ipsius animae
quantum ad actum essendi; eo q:uod haoot esse in aninl8., • • .sed quantum ad
actum intelligendi. nihil prohioot esse e converso. tt Ibid., ad 1.3.

-

2~In con.:firmation: "illud propria dicitur praesens cuius essentia

intellectui vel senaui presentatur." In III Sent., 24, 1, 2 ad 4. It is here
that we have a satisfying explanation or the Ne~Platonic notion ot the soul
as substantially "bent back" on itself. The first "movement" is the emanation
of intellect from the essence of the soul. The "return" is the relation of
this intellect to the essence ronaidered as object of habitual knowledge.
Since both "movements ff are wholly in the spiritual realm, with no intermediate
organ, the return is well termed,· "subsistentia rei in seipsG."tt in De Ver., 2,
2 ad 2.

--

5)
Thomas the ontologica.l relationship ot essence to power in the human soul
consti tuted a kind ot knowledge.

For him it was knowledge just as it is

knowledge when a species remains habitually :in the intellect and disposes it

to know whrt the species represents.
Thus the presence of the BOul to i tselt
essence of the soul to its own intellect.

:i.8

actually the presence of the

A.s presence of an intelligible

(because immaterial) being it is called knowledge. As presence to its own
int.ellect it is called self-knowledge.

Finally, as presence of the principle

of human operations it is alone the ground of the awareness which the soul has
of itself' in t,hose operations.

This third point we w::i.ll expand in

~zing

the final sentence of tille paragraph on hab:Ltual selt-knowledge.

A.d hoc autem quod percipiat a.nima sa esse I et quid in seipsa agatur
attendat, non requ:1ritur aliquis habj.tus; sed ad hoc 8ufficit sola
essentia an:i.mae qu.n.e menM. est praesens, ex ea enim actus
progrediuntur, in quibus actualiter ipsa percipitur. 26

The heart of the statement is that the essence of the soul suff:i.ces for
awnreness of the soul to take place.

This essence is again described as menti

Eaesens.27 As present in this way it grounds awareness of operations (9..uid

!!l

seipsa

aetur),

as well as ·alilaren.ess of its own existence (Sluod :e,ercilP!t

anima se esse).

--

-

26Ibid., 10, 8 e.

27Again the relation of intellect (mens here) to essence as to
of habitual knowledge is underscored.

-

the object

!he reason that the soul
essence it 1s a sour ca

or

80

grounds its self'-awarenes is that in its

the acts perceived--:!!

!!. ~ B;ctu,s l!£9l£!d1untur.

!he acts of the powers are rooted in the soul as in their fo:rma.l principle.
Thus we can point out a pertect parallel ot being with operatjon:

in the line

of being, the essenee of the soul is the subject from which the acts proceed
through the various powers; in the line of opere,tion, the awareness that is

had of the soul is precisely that of an existing subject per.forming de.fWte
operations.
Thus we come to formulate our explanation of habitual scl.f-l.mowledge in
the human soul as the relationship, fourKi :1n the soul in first act, of tm

intellectual power to the essence of the soul, not merely as to the S')1.11'ce

from which it emanates, but to a knowable thing immediately present.
A dewloped understanding of that situation in the constitution of the
human soul can come from comParison with the state ot self-understanding in
an angel, where the intellectual power has an immediate grasp of the angelic
essence in actual knowledge. 28

In man, the result is not imr:lediate actual

selt-unierstanding, since all such 'U.l'lderstanding follows the operat:ton ot
a.gent intellect on a phantasm.

potential state of kI'lOllledge.

The result in man, howver, is not a purely
It is the mediate and developed state of

habitual retention of its essence-of a disposition inclining the human

280r• pp.

37-38, above.

intellect to actual s.U.....arene•• in the operations grounded in the soul.

In conclwdon 1:0 this chapter, let us reter brieny to the concluding
p8J'f1gr&pbs in our study ot th1.1 doctr:1rla in the ~ ~ !!! Sentencea.29
The t1rat obae!"'fttion to be _de is that

\18

haw _en a striking example

of the Mind of st. Thomas in develoJDOnt. We moved with h1m from ecattqred
s"~.

on the topic of human aeltwknovledge tbrougb the tormul.ation of

pneral principles and on to a eyetemat:1o 1il"eatment in whlch the problem is
di'91ded and. aucc1nctlJ" explained in each of its parts according to the guiding

JO 'lb.e

pr1ncjPlea.

explanation ill

cl.ear~

thought out by way of cau8&l

relationahipa and in our tm.al,yais .. found the reasons driftn back to tJle
ontolof~cal

structure of the being in question.

Secondly, we can .t.i.niBh by giving an8'tfOr8 to the ditficul tic. that were
remaitrl.ng at the end of our study of the ~lentarz.2E.!h!. ~ntence..

1)

Habitual. selt-knowledge is partial.l¥ equivalent with the jmmateriallty of the
soul, s:ine8 1mater1allty makes the soul a knower-a habitual knower regarding
it. own existence.

2} Ilmoodiate refl.6ct.1on ia the actuation of habitual

29Ct. PP. 2,-26, abo_.

lOw. would aaait that t.he govern:1ng prinCiples of knowledge were tormuls.ted and were O]:)fll"'fltive 1.n the work of Ht. 'lhomaa long before the diapu.tat1cn
de writate. Ho.wr 11'. ie indicative of bls ontolog1oal approach to the ma~.n
0' knowledge that the prinCiples preceded tbe 8yst.emet:ie explanation
of the posa1b111t3' and operations of ht.sman unde",tand.ing. Thus., feel _
be"" e&Ut;.,t an autJlent1c part of St. 'ihC!'m88 t developnent :In this t..beais, e'ftm
though. the texts ,. are deallng with are tom:u.lat:1oM ot ear11er 5.ntaUectual.
labora.

p;.;,mma

knowledge, because this refiection is equivalent with actual _l:t....vareness

experienced in human operationa. 3) There is knowledge that a th:ing is, apart
from knowledge of its quiddity, since that is what occurs in our awareness of

our own soul. 4) Self-presence and the substantial return in the human soul

are completely explained bY' our understanding that habitual. sel.t-knowledge
expresses the relation of intellect to its ontological source--the soul--1n

man who must gain actual knowledge through phantasms.

CHAPTER V

HABITUAL SELF-KIDWLE:DGE Ttl THE
LATER \-JORKS OF ST. THOMAS

We can conclude the work o:f this thesis by considering St. Thomas' later
treatment of man's knowledee of his own soul.
texts:

In turn we will take up three

first, a chapter in the Sumrr..a
Contra Gentiles$ secondly; an article in
,

the Summa. TheoloGiae; and thirdly, the commentary on the f'::lfteenth proposition

ot

the Li'ber

~

Our purpose in stUdying these texts is to search out

Caus1.s.

aI\Y :f'urther developnent in the notion of the soul t s habitual knowledge

ot

itself.
In the Summa. Contra Gentiles, the soul's reflective knovledge ot itself
is torma.lly trea.tedl as a part of the long discussion ot the end ot man in the
.first sixty-three chapters of. Book Tt'...ree. The immediate context is at.
Thomas' rejection of' the possi.billty ot man comj ng to know God through
knowledge

ot the separated intellectual substances. In turn, he rejects the

different variations on t.1-tis doctrine as proposed by Avempa.ce (ell. 41), by
Alexander of Aphrodisias (oh. 42), and by J~verroes (ch. k3).

Then st. Thomas

shows that the ultimate happiness tor man cannot be in such knowledge ot the
separated substances (ell.

le. 0., nI, 46.
seipsam.. It

44). Then

The title:

he lays down the genera.l solution that in

"Quod anima in hac vita non intelligat
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this lite we can have no understanding of the separated substance. since they
exceed the scope of the human intellect (00.

45).

At the beginning of the next chapter, st. Thomas recognizes that certain
words of st. Augustine seem to propose a difficulty in this matter.

Augustine

is quoted, "'Mens, siout oorporearum rerwn notitias per sensus corporis
colligit, sic incorporea.rum rerum per aemetiPsum • .,2 st. Augustine has alao
said that the soul knows itself "per seipsam."

Thus one could argue that the

soul knows itself directly and thus comes to 'lmderstar.d the incorporeal
separated substances.

st.

Thomas then proceeds to sol'is the apparent difficulty.

the article can be outlimd as having three parts:

The

'boc:9'

of

first .. arguments against

direct understanding of the human soul (~ ~) J secondly, the distinction
based on Aristotle between awareness (quod.2.!.:) of the soul and understand1ng
(~

!..!!) J

and third:Qr, a oorrelation of the knowledge had of the soul with

the knowledge had in this life of the sepsrated aubstanoes.
lie have already touched on the JliB.tter of the first part in our study of
the Commentarz

.2!!

2

Sentences,.3 and the matter of the third

the scope of this thesis.

Therefore we w:ill review

(beginning ~ Aristoteles and ~ ig;!.tur) where

o~

~ ia outside

the two paragraphs

st. Thomas makes the fam1l1ar

distinction between understanding and awareness of the human soul and the respecti'Ve methods to these two kinds of knowledge.

Jet. above, pp. 14-18.
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At the end of the .first section of the chapter,

st.

Thomas haa shown that

Augustine really agrees with him in denying that the soul can understencl
itself directly.

\-Je will take up the second seetj,on of the chapter in tour

parts.

First, Aristotle cert&inly denies direct seU-knowledge in the soul.

The

possible intellect knows itself in the same manner as it knows other thingsthrough the intellig:i.ble species which bring it into act 1.n the intelligible

order.1t.
Secondly, St. Thomas i.mmediatel.y shows the reason tor Aristotle's

position;

considered in ltself, the possible jr·tellect is in potency in the

intelligible order.

Consequently, 11; :1s through the act

(!!!E!2. intelliere)

of the intellect that its nature is man11'ested to itself.

'lhirdl\r, as a consequence, it must

be that Augustine meant that

we have

direct knowledge of the soul in the sense of awareness of its existence.
Fourthly, in a very brief explanation st. Thomas shows that this awarenes
is not a matter o.f demonstration with the species or the act used as a logical
medium.

Rather it is a dlrect perception in the operation ot the soul:

hoc enim ipso quod percipit se agere, perciplt sa esse.
seipsam.

Uncle per seipsa.nl de

Be

cogn08ci t quod est. fl

"ex

Agit autem per

5

4"Intellectu8 poss:lbilis intelligit Be sicut at alia. Intelligit erdm
per apeciem 1,ntelligib1lem qua tit actu in genere intelligibil1um.." 0.0.,
nl, 46 (in mad.).
--

_.

'Ibid
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There are three obseM'ations to 'te made on this pa8sage.
clear

th~t

First, it is

behind the natural flow of quotations, explanations, and arguments

in the passage J there lies the same doctrinal. outline which we saw in the
6 There are two ways . .
Cammenta17
the Sentences and in the l!. Vert tate.

sm

know the soul and the reason for this is in the natval. orientation of the

human intellect to understand what it finds represented in phantasms.

The

subject is not treated in further detail and 80 no mention is made of self'knowledge as 6 habitual disposition of the soul.

The chapter thus adds

nothing directq to our understanding of the central passage we are treating
in this thnis.
Secondly, the awareness of the soul 1s proposed as a fact.

In this sense

the probl.ematic words of St. Augustine are true-here the soul has direct

(E!!. ••i.psam) knowledge ot itself. Our observation is that tor st. Thomas

simply to point out this kind of knowledge as a fact is sufficient jn this
context. The fact is enough to saft the authority of St. Augustine.

It would

be pursu:1ng a tangent to elaborate on habitual selt-knowledge as the disposition

underlying this .,. of knowing the soul.

1'b.1rdlJ, a discussion ot habitual self-kllOWled.ge Wl:>uld haft
St. Thomas in carrying out the purpose of this chapter.

impeded.

Mention of this

6

This is especially true in the concluding summary of the chapters
"Siout autem de an1ma scimus quia est per seipsam, in quantum ejus actus
percipimusJ quid autem sit inquir:1mus ex actibus at objectls per principia
scientiarum speculativaruaJ ita etia de his quae sunt in anima nostra.
8clliclt potentli. et habitibus, sc:imus quidem quia sunt, in quantum actus
~rcip:1mus. Quld vera mnt, ex lpsorum qualitate inveniJnus." Ibld., (ad
fin.).

-
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knowledge which, :i.n the ordinary sense, is net knowledge would have further

complicated the remo'Val of the difficulty which made the chapter necessar,y.
N~

at least, more wou1d be granted to the opposition, and then a

.turtber expL'lnation would be required that the sou1's disposition for self'awareness in nc way contributes to knowledge of the separated substances.

St.

Thomas 8wids these further diseuss:i.ons and returns to his purSUit of the
topic of human destiny from which he turned aside six chapters earlier.

We will turn now to the article in the SumtI18; Theolosiae 7 in which' st.

Thomas answers a question very similar to ths.t treated in the
article8 in whieh we tound the central text at this thesis.
The context of the article is the explanation

eames

to

know

ot

how the

E! .V..-eri;;.;;;.ta;.;·
.
..tel
...
h1.D:t18.n mind

ditterent kinds of being. The three prev::1.ous questions are on

our knowledge of material realities; the subsequent question is on our
knowledge

ot

the separated substances.

This article is the first in the

question on our knowledge of the :interior spiritual realities of the ht2man
person.
The article itself has three main points:

first, an explanaM.on ot the

principle which governs the solution; secondly, the solution of the problem

7S•T., I, 87, 1. ItThe title:
per suintessentlam."

SIn R! Veritate, 10,
cognoscat,

vei

e,

utrum anima intellective. seipsam eognoscat

the title wass

per aliquam speciem."

"Utrum mens seipsam per essentiam
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posed in the title; and thirdly, an explanation of the two ways

ot knowing the

human soul.
First, st. Thomas gives a very tul1 explanation of the principle,
nUnmnquodque cognoscibile est seeundum quod est actu.,,9 This is first shown
be clear from consjderation of sight and understanding in general.

St. Thomas

moves ahead to the a.pplied principle t"ha.t to the degree a being is put in act
by it. essenee, to the same degree w:t1l it be knowable by its easenee.

next point is to apply this developed principle to God, an angel,

am

'lhe
to the

human soul.10 Both God and the angel have immediate knowledge of themselws
since by their essences they are :tn act in the intelligible order.

The h'Ul'lWl

possible intellect however is purely potential in the intelligible order.

Thus the possible intellect will not come to know i tsel1' or the soul I 8 essence
until it goes into act.
The second part of the article is a brief diSCUssion of the mode of actus.
knowing in the human mind.

It is carried out by' setting up the Platonic

explanation of knowledge through grasp of separated intelligible torms in

contrast with st. Thomas' explanation through abstract.ion by the light of
agent intel.lect.

Since it is' by a.bstractive knowledge that the possible

intellect goes into act in the intelligible order,

80

also in this manner

does the mind come to know itself.

91_1.,

I, 87, 1 c.

IGrhis is the same method employed by st. Thomas in De Veritate, 8, 6.
Cl. abow, p.

hO.

-

6';

In the t.hird section of th1a ar\icle. St. Thoma. proceeda to ducribe
the -tit., lIIl18 in Whlch this knowledge of the aoul take. pla.ce.
ont

lnoVledge of

t" singular existence (j! ~1c1ll.ari.)1a cont..ruted wi.tb knoWledge of the

nature of the soul

<!2 un1ve~).

!he aecond, or scientific, mamer of

tact that the agent intel.leot
d1v1m light of .tt~mal truth. U In f'urther

lmow1ng the 80ul 18 ult1mate~ justified 'by the

1. a participation in the

explaining the di1'.ference bet1Men tbe. tM:J waye of lmcndng ~. ThOlUJl po:lnt8

totbe fact "deb waa mc:ph:1ned in the De Ventate
passage whicb 1a the
n
........

U

ll,

pr1nc1pal topic ot thia tneca.

Eat autem different1a int.er hu duu cognitionea.

~:Ul

ad prlJaam

CO¢t10Nml de mente habendam. auttielt Ipsa mentis praesent1a, quae
eat princ1pium aotus, ex quo Mna percd.pit 84Itlpaaa. et ideo dioit-v
.. cogno. .re per auan praeaentia. Sed ad 8fMrund.am cogni'tiOJB1
de MDt. habendam non su.tfici"ejWl pra8eentia, _4 requiri tur
dS11gena at aubt1l18 1nqu18itio. Onde et multi naturs.m lUrlmae
ignorant, .t rrrulti .t1M c1rea nat'Unll ,mimae erra:verunt.12
'lhu8 the lOuree (enola-) of the operatlon 1. describE!d as being

pre_nt to the aind aDd tor this reuon gJ'Ounding the

.lf~nes.

had lid. t.h

the soul's operations. !hue .. he.'Ia an ~ate awarenes. contrasted. Vittl
knowledge gld.ned by' cllreful. :intellectual labor.

And

the reason for the

llttJud1cium et effioacia huius eognitJ.oniII. per quam naturam Mjmae
eognoacdmuB, competjJ. nobis ~ derlvationis ltaini8 intellectue noetrt a
Writate dirt., in qua l;"8tionel omnium 1'el"'UDl eont1nen.tur." 8.1.. I, 87, 1 c.
fbe thought of this pa. . . ia exaet..ly parallel with that ot \\ie tovth part.
of the corpus in B!. Venltate, 10, 8.

12~.~.,

I,

67, 1 c.

:immediacy of the former is sblpJ.y stated as the presenee of the source of

hllmall operations. Our judgment is that this state of presence is exactlJ'

-

what st. Thomas discussed in our De Veritate passage on habitual sel..f'-

knovledge.

It is the same d1Bposi tion of the soul, but here not given the

ample description through comparison with habitual knowledge through retained

speci...
We will make

tlft)

observations on this treatment of the soult. knowledge

of 1 tselt in the Summa Theologiat;.
First, let us point out the reasons why St. Thomas did not make explicit
mention of the soul's habitual knowledge of itself.

One might bring forth as

a reason the need for brevity and clarity in a manual of doctrine such as the
Summa 1'heolods!.

This reason does have some weight when one compares the

corpus of this article with other articles and finds that in s1ze it is

d.etin1te17 beyond the average.
A more cogent reason would lie in the difference of intellectual

-

atmosphere surrounding the writing of the De Veritate and the Summa

Theolopu.

In the earlier work, especially in the tenth question, the

author! ty at hand is st. Augustine.

From the concluding

stmImB.1')"

of the

eighth article . . see that two of the four explanations are consonant with the
doctrine and words of st. Augustine .13 When we move to the S\.U.!Wa, the

--

l3n.

Ver., 10, 8 (ad fin. corp.). It would be reasonable to argue that
the treatment of habitual selt-knowledge in the De Veritate is abled indirectly
at establishing a sense in 1I1hich the words of Augu.'iine, "Mens aeips8m per
seipaSJD. nov1t, If are true. A closeq related purpose is to leave intact the
Augustinian explanation of the soul as an image of the Trinity. Thie i8
clea:r~ the purpose when st. Thomas mentions habitual selt-knowledge in the
Summa Theolofjae: ItSic_patet quod ~ semper intelUgit et amat . , non
ac'ttDtlITJjr. 4 i habitual1ter. 1t :t Y 5 1 ad k.

6,
unchallenged authority is Aristotle.

In the article we have been study:Lng, it

is an Aristotelian principle Which governs the extended discussion in the
first part of the corpus.

Correlatively with the dominance of Aristotle, we

find the express rejection of a Pl.a:tonic position.

Now i f habitual seU...}mowledge had been introduced,

st.

Thanas wou1.d haw

had to do more than simply insert a distinction in the f'1nal part to show that

-

self-awareness is had in two ways" actu and habitue

He would need a diatinc-

tion right in the middle ot the el.aboration ot the Aristotelian governing
principle.

For then the human mind wouJ.d not appear 'in all respects a

purel¥

potential knower, but regarding i tselt the mind would be in the modified
disposition described in the

!2!. ....Ve;;;ri;.;;;;.;,,;ta;;,.;te... as

itself' through its essence.

It is easy to see this sense of a need for

the soul's habitual knowledge of

brevity and clarity as an adequate ground tor omitting treatment of' habitual.
seU-knowledge in this article of the SUmma.

A second observation on the article concerns methodology.

\~e

find a

confirmation of our own choice of approach in th:t s thesis in the manner in
wMch St. Thomas proceeds to explain his answer :tn this article.

elaborates a general. principle to guide his sE-arch tor the answer.

First, he
vlith the

parity between actuality trom essence and self-knowledge from essence

established, it is a simple matter to find how the soul knows itself by showing bow the po ••ible intellect is actuated.

Speaking gererally, our procedure

was to £1nd the el.ements of an explanation in the Commen1;!£Y .2! !!:! Sentences,
then the guiding principles in the earlier sections of the
then

to apply these prinCiples to show

exac~

the habitual knowledge the soul has of itself.

.!!!. ....Ve_ri-...,.ta...,te...."

and

what was to be understood by
The present article shows us

that such is an authentically Thomistic methodology_
We will turn now to consider st. Thomas' commentary on Proposit.1.on XV of
the Libel'

.2!

caUSi8.14

OUr consideration will proceed in three stepst

a brief cons:i.deration of the oircumstances and intention of
Oommenta:z

~

!.!!. Libel' .:!!. Caus1sJ

st.

first"

Thomas.

secondly, an examination of his text on

Proposition XV; and thirdly, our observations on the contribution of the
passage to the understanding of the

B!

Veritate passage on habitual self-

knowledge.

The facts surrounding the writing of the Comm.enta;rz can be set forth in
brief.

In }lay, 1268, lrlilliam of Moerbeck presented st. '!barons with a Latin

translation ot mclus' Elements

E! ~eoloSl .. 1S'

a deductive and axiomatic

exposition of the world-picture of Nee-Platonism.
Immediately, St. Thomas saw t.hat the Libel'

..2! _Ca_u....s....i ...s was

nothing more

than a digest of the doctrine of Proclu8, made up of excerpts from the
Elements

2! TheoloQ:~

Thus, a £u11 o:,:planat:i.on of the tiber

.!!2 Librum .2!

could

19,,).

l40ur references will
edition.

~ Cauis

be ,to the paragraph m.mlbers in the new Marietti
Caus:ts E?q2?sitio" ad. Ceslaus Pera, o.P. (Turin,

lSPeter Cnramello" "Pertinenta ad Librum fde causis,lO Ibid., p. xx.

J.6.rhus st. Thomasa "In arabico vero invenitur hic libel' qui apud latinoa
'de GaUSis' dicitur quem constat de arabico esse tr&nalatum et in graeco
pen1tus non !laberi. Unde videtur ab aliquo Philosophormu arabum ex praedicto
libro Procli exoerptus, pra.esertim quia omnia quae in hoc libro contimmtur.
multo plerdue e1# di1'tu.si'U's oontinentur in 1110. Ibid., Prooemi:um, n. 9.

-
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be made by fitting its var:ious propositions into their original context in the

thought of Proclus. This is the work of st. Thanas' Comment:a!"Y.17 For
example, in the seotion of the commentary

l~

are about to take up, siX

different pr:-opositions are taken from Proclus' E,lelIents to aid our urd.erstand-

lt3
ing of the 'WOrds of the .;;;;.;;0.;;;",;;;0;;._"';;;;;;';;;;';;;;;;;
Liber de CauBis.
...

The actual text of st. Thomas can be broken dow into three parts,

first,

the insertion of the six Proclean propositions to expand the Liber ~ Causis

text (nn • .302-307); secondly,

text

ot

st.

Thomas' analysis of the three parts of the

-

the Liber de Gausis (nn. 308-311) J and ttdrdly', the c<.:IUI1ems of

,

st.

Thomas on the doctrine found in trJ.s passage (nn. 312-313).
The first aspeot of this conmlentDry pertinent to our thesis is the idea,
presented in both the first and second parts of

st.

Thomas' text, that sinoe

the soul returns upon itself in the opera.tion of eelf-knowledge, it must also

return upon itself in its own BUbstance.19 This substantial return is shown

17The work also fits into the controversial ourrent of the t:iJne", Thus:
"Genu1num sensum et valorem libri de Gauais patefaciens, (st. Tbcnas) hunc
librum. a sectatoribus Averroismi etA'iIcennismi, ,tanquam ab iniusti.

po saessoribus, J in usum IlJUUDl 'Vindicat' et siC tutiUB defendere potest tlJll

mult1plioationem intellectus in singulls hominibus (oontra Averroistas) tum
unitatem formae aubsta'I'J.tialis in unoquoque (contra Avi cennizantes), 1deoque
veram at sanam dootrinam de horninis natura servare." Caralnello, p. xx.v1.

....

1651;. Thomas, In Librum .......
de Causis,
, lect. 15, nne 302-307.

19These doctrinal points are given twice. The substantial return is
given, first, as found 5.n Proolus, Ibid., rul. 305-3<:6, and seoondly, as in the
Libel' de Causis, Ibid., n. 310 (ad 1iil.). lie saw this idea expl.ained by St.
Thom."'si'n the lA! 'Veri'tate section on divine sel.f-know1edge. Cf. above, pp.
3~-.35.

-
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to

be equ:1:valent

to the soul's subsistence or independence ot matter.

20

This,

in turn, points to the human soul' a spirituality, or separability tram

matter.

21

Thus tar the f'ormal exposition of' the doctrine of Proelua and the

The most pertinent aspect

ot

the Co1mnent!!2 for our thesis is the third

part where st. Thomas gives his observations on the text.

must determine whether the Cownenta:z

~

It is here that _

!!!! Moor .9! Causla

contains any

manitestation ot St. Thomas' thought on the ground ot self'-awareness. 22
Our conclusion is that the entire passage

ot the commentary on

PropoSition XV i8 the transmission and comparison ot the thought of others,
not the personal. doctrim of' st. Thomas. The evidence grounding the conclusion
is found in the last two paragraphs of the passage (nn. 312-31.3). First, St.
Thomas refers to another proposition of Proclus as proof of' the initial statement ot t.he L1ber

!!. _Ca...U8
.......
1s
... that

the soul does know itself.

This proof is in

the tact that the soul. is a participant in the same nature as the superiOr

intellectual bei.ngs which know themselves.
I

Seeon<D.y, he refers to an earlier

_ _ _ __

section of the Liber de C&U81a. to show that the First Intellect does know
itself. '1'h1rdly, he refers to the

R!. -.D1..ri
__n;;;;i,;;;,s

Naninibus of Pseudo-Denis, to

2~ Libr1D ;!! causis, nne .304, 3lJ..

~d.,

nne 303-.307, lll.

22As noted above (p. 9) Fr. Georges Ducoin pointed to this passage as
st. Thomas I doctrine on selfknowledge. Sapient1a Aquinati~, pp. 247-2Sl.
being of capital importance as he presented

show more precisely the jrn.port for selt-knowledge of participation from

separated intellectual beings.

Fourthly,

st.

Thome.a adds that the human soul

partiCipates in an inferior manner in this intellectual nature and
have illlmediate grasp of itself.
the Summa

on the

~

the human soul comes to know itself'.
~ ~

Liber

does not

Fifthly, st. 'fbomas repeats what we saw in

1heolO~1ae23 on the contrasting ways proposed

Thomas 1 Comment.!2:

80

.2! Causie,

by Plato and Aristotle

Thus it appears that St.

in treating Proposition

X'f',

is an

historical study in philosophic thought on the implict't10ns of human
reflective knowledge.

As such it mal{es no sign..ificant addition to our under-

-

standing ot St. Thomas' mind as expressed :tn the De Veritate section on the
soul f s bahitual knowledge of' itself.
With our study of the
ample review

ot

back on itself.

Commen~ ~ ~

tiber

~

Qausis we are given an

the Neo-Platonic picture of' the soul as

substantial~

bent

st. Thomas does explain to us that this return is ultimate4*"

a result ot the soul t s participation in the perfectly sel.f..knowi1'lg First
Intellect. Thus Neo-.Platonism would point to the M.story of this disposition
of the soul, present to its knowing pol>rer, which underlies the selt-mmreneae
a man baa in hie operations.

OUr ~ ....
Vc.-r....i ....
ta;...te
...

of this disposition.

2,S.T., I, 87, 1 c.
--
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